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The Various Equals at Plato's Phaedo 74b-c NICHOLAS D. SMITH THE SCHOLARLY CONCERN that has been generated by Plato's singular reference to "cta3x& x~t [oct" at Phaedo 74cl has been considerable,1 and for good reason. For although the argument in which it appears is not the central argument of the Phaedo, it is one of the comparatively few places in which Plato offers us an argument that purports to show that we must acknowledge the existence of nonsensible entities. Given this, it is of paramount importance for the scholar of Platonic philosophy to determine what sorts of objects Plato is countenancing in it. The standard interpretation of this argument views Plato as being considerably liberal in his use of synonymous expressions to refer to but one abstract entity, the Form of Equality.2 Thus, the adherent of this view reads three separate locutions as being coextensive : "ct0T& x& [oct," "~1 ~06X~lg," and "ct0xb rb [oov." I will not attempt a detailed summary of the criticism of this view that has appeared in the literature) However, the most recent attack, by Michael Wedin, merits special attention.4 According to Wedin, the standard interpretation is unsatisfactory for the following reasons: . The association of "a0x& x6t [oct" and "ct0xb xb [oov" suggested by Geach, Vlastos, and Mills, that requires us to understand the Form Equality to be a composite of perfectly equal parts is problematic on conceptual grounds/ I am greatlyindebtedto GregoryVtastosand JuliusMoravcsikfor their commentson earlierdraftsof this paper, and to the NationalEndowmentfor the Humanitiesfor helpingto fundpart of my work on this and other topics. All errorsare, of course, minealone. t See the bibliographyin Michael V. Wedin, "A~'~t z6t [oct and the Argumentof Phaedo 74b7-c5," Phronesis 23 (1978):191-205. 1 will refer specificallyonlyto those works directlyrelated to claims made withinthispaper. 2Representativeinterpretationsof this type can be foundin: P. T. Geach, "TheThirdMan Again,"Philosophical Review 65 (1956):72-82; R. P. Haynes, "The Form Equalityas a Set of Equals:Phaedo 74b-c," Phronesis 9 (1964):17-26; K.W. Mills, "Plato, Phaedo 74b7-c6," parts I and II, Phronesis 2 (1957:128-47, and 3 (1959):40-58; J.M. Rist, "Equals and Intermediates in Plato," Phronesis 9 (1964):27-37; G. Vlastos, "Postscriptto the Third Man: A Replyto Mr. Geach,"Philosophical Review 65 (1956):83-94. 3The best representativesof suchcriticisms,priorto Wedin's, are to be foundin R. S. Bluck's two papers on this issue: "Forms as Standards,"Phronesis 2 (1957):115-27; "Plato's Form of Equal," Phronesis 4 (1959):5-11. 4Wedin's argumentrecallsBluck's 1959view, thoughnot explicitly,and is thus susceptibleto criticisms by Haynesand Ristthat were addressedto Bluck, as notedbelow. 5Wedin,pp. 193-94. [1] 2 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 2. Vlastos's argument that Greek grammar permitted the plural neuter adjective plus article to refer to abstract single entities is insufficient evidence for reading "~ta3x~t x~t [o~t" as referring to the Form. For each time Plato engages in such a usage in a clear reference to the Form, the plural involved is not modified by a form of "r Independent evidence is required for the view that the intensive may be used in this way. 6 3. This view makes the second premise of Plato's argument redundant. About this, Wedin says, "although not affecting the argument's validity, this considerably tarnishes its elegance. ''7 4. Finally, Wedin denies that this interpretation has a unique claim to rendering Plato's argument valid without an expansion of what is uncontroversiaUy Plato's ontology, 8 for Wedin offers a competing view that does the same. And his view does not suffer from such problems as those cited in reasons 1-3, above. In the following section, I will briefly review the aspects of Wedin's view that conflict with the standard view and show why I think it encounters certain difficulties. I will then go on to show how I think Wedin's criticisms of the standard view can be overcome . The Wedin View According to Wedin, the troublesome plural at 74cl refers to immanent equals, that is, the equal properties in the things that are equal in one way, unequal in another. 9 Thus, although x and...

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