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BOOK REVIEWS 373 to which Kant failed to elucidate the meaning of horizon in relation to the transcendental object which he called an X (p. 374). The X, the author asserts, is replaced in Being and Time by the "world" which explains what Kant had left open, namely, how objects are present to man (p. 375). It is a good example of Heidegger's tendency to delve into what a philosopher left unsaid and of how it stimulated his own thinking. Despite the fact that it represents the climax of his study, Vitiello puts his discussion of Being and Time at the end of his long book. If I understand him right the author dealt with Heidegger's later work first in order to bring out the following point. With his first great work Heidegger has reached his final position. Its dominating thought, which remains the focus after the "Kehre," is, the author claims, "thinking Being without being" (p. 438). Moreover, Vitiello believes that the so-called Kehre occurs in the second part of Being and Time, which is concerned with temporality and historicity. In the conclusion Vitiello thus asserts--and it will shock some Heideggerians-that there was no need for a third section, which in any event was never written (p. 469), It is impossible to give an idea of the intricate analysis of Being and Time. The author discusses the important concepts of Heidegger's existential analytic such as guilt, anxiety, death, care, finitude, and freedom. But he handles these problems in his own way, always focusing on Being-Nothingness. Vitiello states that fallenness of Dasein (inauthentic existence as nothingness) and the ontological difference are the same, although their respective orientations differ. Dasein rescues itself from fallenness (nothingness) in designing projects, whereas the ontological difference has "its center of gravity in nothingness" (p. 418). But the latter includes Dasein and its projects, and the ontological difference in turn becomes effective through Dasein. This of course raises the question of the hermeneutic circle. Finally, Vitiello devotes a chapter to temporality and historicity, which in his view represent the very core of Heidegger's philosophy. One may disagree with some of the author's judgments, but this does not detract from the great stimulation the reader will receive from the book. An index of names and a bibliography are added. ELISABETHFEIST HIRSCH Trenton State College Ian Craib. Existentialism and Sociology: A Stud3; of Jean-Paul Sartre. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976. Pp. viii + 237. $18.50. A considerable number of studies on the philosophy of Sartre are notoriously more difficult to comprehend than his original work. They tend to monopolize the ontological themes of Being and Nothingness, thereby accentuating Sartre's philosophy as the philosophy of exclusive subjectivity, dread, ambiguity, and so on. One can only hope that the recently translated Critique de la raison dialectique, Sartre's later and major work, which focuses more on sociological themes than does his earlier work, may modify the present emphasis, although such a change will most likely depend on the availability of secondary expositions. Even the few books already available in English, which deal with the contents of the Critique, do so in a narrowly selective manner and, moreover, do not approach the work as necessarily sociological (an exception is the study by Wilfrid Desan, The Marxism of Jean-Paul Sartre [New York: Doubleday Anchor, 1966]). The present analysis by Craib is therefore much desired insofar as it is a lucid exposition and a serious attempt to reconcile the ostensibly opposing emphases of existential philosophy and sociology. Being and Nothingness and the Critique are the two works which inform Craib's analysis. Despite the differing thematic and philosophical perspectives m each of the two, the one dealing with ontology, the other with history, Craib nevertheless succeeds in lending a unity to both. The concern with individual freedom in Being and Nothingness anticipates the structure of freedom in 374 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY the Critique as a social-historical project. Whether or not there is a break or a continuity in Sartre's work is a disputed issue. Craib skillfully deals with this problem. Indeed, the significant value of the book lies precisely...


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pp. 373-375
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