1. Parva Naturalia: Revised Text with Introduction and Notes, ed. W. D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1955), p. 16. These arguments are addressed by I Block,. "The Order of Aristotle's Psychological Writings," American Journal of Philology 82 (1961):50ff. Ross further argues his point in his edition of the De Anima (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1961), pp. 7-12. This issue has provoked a continuous, and progressively more unwieldly. literature. For a most helpful survey and classification of more recent studies, see W. F. R. Hardie, "Concepts of Consciousness in Aristotle," Mind 85 (1976):388-411.
2. On Memory. De Memoria et Reminescentia, trans., with interpretive summaries, by R. Sorabji (London: Duckworth, 1972), p. 5. Sorabji himself considers Aristotle almost exclusively in terms of Humean and post-Humean distinctions.
3. De Memoria 1, 449b6-9. All translations of the De Memoria are those of J. I. Beare from the Oxford translation reprinted in The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. R. McKeon (New York: Random House, 1941), pp. 607-17.
4. Rep. 6, 486c ff.; Phil. 34 ff.; Phaedo 73b-c, e; Hipp Min. 368-369b.
5. Phil. 60d, 64a5; Cratylus 437b3; Rep. 6, 490c11, 494b2; Tim. 74e8-75.
6. Rep. 6, 486c-d, Theaet. 194d.
7. Here we find a quote from Theaet 191d as well as references to likenesses, images, and contemplation.
8. Theaet. 191d-197a.
9. Phil 34a10.
10. Theaet. 146c, 187b2-3.
11. Theaet. 151e2-3.
12. Theaet. 160a-d5, 181c ff.
13. Theaet. 182e-183.
14. Theaet. 185e6. All translations of the Theaetetus are those of F. M Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Co , 1935).
15. Theaet. 186e4-5
16. Theaet 187b5.
17. Theaet. 190a3
18. Theaet 191c8-e.
19. Theaet. 191e3-4.
20. Theaet. 194a8-b6.
21. Theaet. 191c5-195b5, 195d-2.
22. See Rep. 6, 486d-487a5.
23. Theaet. 196a-d.
24. R. Hackforth, Plato's Examination of Pleasure (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1945), p. 5. All translations of the Philebus are those of Hackforth
25. See esp Phil. 38a-40; Hackforth, pp. 72-73
26. Phil. 34a.
27. Phil 34a5; cf. Phaedo 65a5: Theaet. 160b-c.
28. Phil. 34a2-3.
29. Phil. 34a10
30. Phil. 34b6-8; cf. Meno 98a4; Phaedo 73b5ff
31. Phil. 34e9-35b4.
32. Phil. 34b6-9.
33. Phil. 35b4-c.
34. Phil. 35c9-10; cf. Theaet. 163b ff.
35. Phil. 35d-3.
36. See Pol. 267d8; Rep. 1, 345d-5; Laws 10, 892-b3
37. See K. Lycos, "Aristotle and Plato on Appearing," Mind n s 73 (1964):498-99
38. See Phaedo 96b ff.
39. Plato insists on the priority of soul to body in a number of contexts. See Phil 39d5, Phaedrus 245cb-246e6, Laws 10, 892a-b.
40. Here, although Plato does not explicitly make the point in the Philebus, we can see the importance (and the lack of it) in the distinction between memory and recollection Memory is the activity of soul which yields experience when body provides an occasion; recollection is the same spiritual activity conducted wholly independently of body. See Meno 81d5, e4, 98a4, Phaedo 72e5. Since body makes no epistemic contribution to sensation, there is little difference between memory and recollection as spiritual activity. For example, one can actually see a dog, or one can recall the shape of a dog. Soul is fully responsible for both experiences. The major difference between the experiences is that memory is less free from body than is recollection Because body provides the occasion on which memory yields sensation, memory is "enslaved" to preserve this or that, as body occasions. Recollection operates independently from body (from what soul experiences when together with body), and so recollection can recall either this occasion or that occasion and is thus freer than memory Because it is freer from bondage to body, recollection is more desirable than memory and of a higher epistemic order.
41. Hackforth, p. 72
42. Phil. 39a5-7.
43. See Theaet 203a ff.; Phaedo 96a5-97c
44. Phil. 39b3-4; cf. Rep. 6, 510a-2, 510e-3; 7. 514 ff.