The Structure of Plato's Philosophy (review)

BOOK REVIEWS 105 implication that since there is no final good that is specifiable in nondisputed terms, there is no external standard for correctness of views about morality. "Plato rejects the external standard; moral beliefs cannot be tested for correctness except by the procedure of the elenchos, which may yield a systematic, coherent account of moral judgments, but may not link them to any external standard. When Plato rejects Socrates' guarantee of objectivity for moral beliefs, and offers no substitute, he rejects the demand for such a guarantee as illegitimate" (pp. 159-60). Irwin also claims that there is no reason to ascribe to Plato the view that Forms are intended as "absolute standards," the cognition of which (perhaps by some sort of direct acquaintance) issues in heightened moral certainty (p. 321, n. 47). But surely the talk of the unhypothetical first principle (Republic 510b, 511b, 533c-d), and the need for it in order to convert hypotheses into knowledge , shows that Plato would not have been satisfied with mere consistency, unanchored to an external standard (see Cratylus 436c-d). And does not the whole theme of Books VI-VIII, the need for the philosopher kings to reach an apprehension of the Good (conceived of as an independently existing standard), clearly illustrate Plato's view that the direct apprehension of Forms does indeed issue in heightened moral certainty (see Republic 520c)? To abandon this view is, one might argue, to abandon the very core of Platonism. Irwin holds that "the Good is not some further being besides the Forms; when we have correctly defined them, connected in a teleological system, we have specified the Good, which just is the system" (p. 225). But the "logic" of the Sun simile (as revealed, e.g., by 508b-e, 509b) seems to tell against this interpretation; 507b5-7 seems distinctly to imply that the Form of the Good is one among the other Forms. There are other places where Irwin offers provocative interpretations, such as his analysis of the Symposium's "ascent" passage (pp. 209ff.) and its relevance to the problem of connecting Platonic justice with concern for the interests of others. As Irwin says in his preface, he has "not tried to play safe" (p. viii). The result is an exciting book that challenges a number of orthodoxies in the interpretation of Plato's moral philosophy. Defenders of these received views will find that Irwin gives them much to think about. RICHARDHOGAN Southeastern Massachusetts University Jerry S. Clegg. The Structure of Plato's Philosophy. Lewisburg, Penn.: Bucknell University Press, 1977. Pp. 207. $10.50. In this book, Jerry Clegg ambitiously undertakes to display the elements that provide an underlying unity to Plato's philosophy. Thus, having identified what he considers to be two central Platonic concerns in an introduction, Clegg attempts to illuminate thei operation in five areas of Platonic inquiry: metaphysics, epistemology, psychology, aesthetics, and politics. According to Clegg, Plato's philosophy can be understood best when viewed as an attempt to do two things. First, though Plato took seriously and, to a certain extent, even accepted the skepticism of the Sophists and the Eleatics, he sought to temper those views in such a way as to allow at least some escape from their conclusions. In the case of the former, Plato accepts that nature and art are to be distinguished, and he agrees further that nature must provide the basis of morality. His disagreement with the Sophists, however, was in viewing what they considered nature as mere appearance, the product of divine art. The true nature to be distinguished from art is that embodied in the realm of Forms. Thus, Plato accepts the distinction made by the Sophists but rejects their account of the extension of that distinction. Both the nature and the art of the Sophists are but art; divine in the case of the former, and human in the case of the latter. Real 106 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY nature, according to Plato, is not recognized by the Sophists. With respect to the Eleatics, Clegg finds Plato in agreement with their view that motion is an incoherent concept but denies that such agreement warrants the total abandonment of empirical...