Substance, Body, and Soul: Aristotelian Investigations (review)

500 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY S and Z claim that, though the term is used in other ways in other dialogues, " 'knowledge' is conceived in terms of 'acquaintance' in the Meno" (p. 32), where "acquaintance" has the flavor of Russeilian "knowledge by acquaintance." And they suggest that, since it is "palpably untrue" that "we must know what a thing is before we can know its properties, that is, how it is acquired," we are helped in understanding the contention by thinking of virtue as some sort of thing with which we might be "acquainted" (pp. 23-24). Now I think it is palpably true that, leaving minor quibbles aside, I could hardly decide or know how to go about deciding whether virtue could be taught without knowing what virtue is (or at least having some sort of working definition). Since no one has to be taught to see (i.e., see simpliciter), though he/she may have to be taught how to see using a microscope, if virtue were like seeing, obviously it could not be acquired by teaching. I have puzzled a great deal the question why S and Z think what I take to be a truism to be false, and I think that I now understand why. They seem to think of the Socrates of Meno as taking virtue to be a thing like a tree or a bird, of which, until you have "seen" it, you cannot confidendy answer questions about its color or size. Thus their use of "know its properties," that is, observe or see them. Needless to say, they understand the slave boy's recognition of the square drawn in the sand as some sort of "acquaintance," and they proceed accordingly in explaining his "recollection" of the procedure for doubling the area. Also needless to say, I think that anachronistic use of Russellian "acquaintance" is a very dubious matter, but I can here only hint at the reasons for so finding it. A final comment. Though it is easy to see how Plato's allowing the conversation to shift from the search for a definition to an attempt--without satisfactory definition-to decide whether it can be taught leads into the idea of virtue's being (based on) true belief acquired as a gift of the gods (and S and Z analyze this move very nicely), I can hardly see justification for understanding the Meno Plato as endorsing some sort of "pragmatic" approach to political problems and some sort of "openness" (pp. 124ff.) to various projects. Even the apparent endorsement of Pericles and others as virtuous men (in contrast to, say, Gorg/as), though suggestive, is fairly slight warrant for finding a practically oriented Plato. But here S and Z's finding "a complete philosophic structure" in each dialogue becomes an important assumption indeed. ROBERT G. TURNBULL Ohio State University Edwin Hartman. Substance, Body, and Soul: Aristotelian Investigations. Princeton: Princeton University Press, t978. Pp. xi + 992. $17.5o. Hartman calls his investigations "Aristotelian"; that is, he proposes to consider Aristotle in light of contemporary problems in analytic philosophy. For example, Hartman imagines Aristotle conversing with Strawson on the problem of individuals (pp. 39"49; see also pp. 156-66). The announced project thus focuses on certain problems ---especially individuals and the mind-body problem--that are of interest to BOOK REVIEWS 5ol contemporary analysis and examines Aristotle's possible contributions to resolving these problems (p. 7). This project is surely legitimate and potentially interesting; but both the method Hartman applies to it and the conclusions he eventually reaches are open to serious question. Hartman's proclaimed thesis is that, except for events involving n0v.s, Aristotle is a materialist (pp. 4, 6, 1o, 19, 152 ). But Hartman himself acknowledges that Aristotle's doctrine of nous (usually translated "mind" and related to the verb noe/n, to think) is crucial to his psychology (chap. 6) as well as to his ethics (pp. 94ff.). Although Hartman fails to indicate this point, nous is also central to Aristotle's theology and metaphysics: the first cause of the world, God, is a thinking on thinking (Metaph. 12, 7, lo72b14ff.). Hartman never overcomes or resolves the ambiguity which these...