Aristotle's Wish

Aristotle's Wish ALFRED R. MELE IN Nicomachean Ethics (NE) VI. 2 Aristotle asserts that "the origin of action-its efficient, not its final cause--is choice (prohairesis), and that of choice is desire and reasoning with a view to an end" (1139a31-32). It is evidently a special kind of action about which Aristotle is speaking here, for although all chosen actions are voluntary, not all voluntary actions are chosen (NE 1 1 1 lb7-1o, 1 112aa4-a 5, Eudemian Ethics [EE] 1226b34-36, Magna Moralia [MM] x189a33ff.; cf. NE 1135b8-1o). Just what type of action he has in mind becomes clearer when, one line later in VI. 2, he informs us that "choice cannot exist.., without a moral state" (1139a33-34). Chosen action is ethical action. It is the kind of action which is indicative of an agent's moral character (e.g., NE 111 lb5-6, EE 1228al-4), and, therefore, the kind with which Aristotle's ethical works are primarily concerned. Now, the "reasoning with a view to an end" which issues in choice is clearly deliberation (bouleusis) (e.g., NE 1113a4- 5, 9-12), and the desire which prompts choice-generating deliberation is wish (boul~sis) (EE 1226b2-5; cf. x227a3- 5, NE 1113b3-4). Thus, a complete account of Aristotelian ethical action must also be an account of choice, deliberation, and wish. But although prohairesis and bouleusis have received a good deal of attention in discussions of Aristotle's thought on action, boul#sis has not. This is unfortunate; for not only does wish play an important part in Aristotle's account of chosen action, also there are some interesting problems of interpretation surrounding his notion of wish, a careful investigation of which promises to yield valuable information about the roles which he assigns to intellect, character, and desire in the generation of chosen action. Moreover, as I shall briefly indicate in the final section of this paper, Aristotle's boulfsis may helpfully be put to work in an account of autonomy, an agent-property which ought to figure importantly in any theory of human action. Aristotle makes three distinctive claims about wish. (1) We wish only for what we think to be good (NE 1136b7-8, Rhetoric [Rhet.] 1369a3; cf. EE 1223b7, 32-33) whereas desires of other kinds may be for things not [139] 14o ARISTOTLE'S WISH thought good by the desirer. (2) Wish is the only form of desire (orexis) found in the rational part of the soul (De Anima IDA] 432b5, Topics [Top.] i26a12-13; cf. Rhet. i369aiff. ). (3) Wish is for ends (NE ial3al 5, b3; cf. 111 ibe6); wish is "specially" (malista) of ends (EE i226ai3-i 4, i6; cf. NE 111 abe6). In the bulk of this paper, I shall attempt to clarify the meaning and significance of each of these claims and to resolve (sometimes in footnotes ) the interpretational problems which surround them. I hope thereby to contribute not only to our knowledge of the part assigned to wish in the generation of "chosen" or "ethical" action, but to our appreciation, more generally, of Aristotle's position on the roles of thought and desire in action of this sort and his understanding of ethical action itself. 1. WISH, APPETITE, AND THINKING GOOD Aristotle divides orexis (desire) into three types, boul~sis (wish), epithumia (appetite ), and thumos (passion or anger) (DA 414b~, Motion of Animals (MA) 7oob22, MM i 187b36ff., EE 1223a~6-27; cf. EE ~225b25-26, DA 432b56 ). The distinguishing features of wish have already been noted. Appetite is said to be the desire for pleasure (Top. 14ob27-28, DA 414b5-6, Posterior Analytics [Post. An.] 661a8, EE 1223a34, Rhet. 137oa17; cf. NE 1111a32-33, b16-17, EE ie35bee, Rhet. 1369bi 5, DA 434a3). But not all appetites are for base pleasures; for to feel appetite, anger, fear, confidence, pity, and, in general, pleasure and pain, "at the right times, with reference to the right objects, toward the right people, with the right motive, and in the right way, is what is both intermediate and best, and this is characteristic of virtue" (NE 1lo6b18-23; cf. 1119b14-18, 1148a2e-28, 1lo9a'~o...