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BOOK REVIEWS 249 accept the slant that fbr Hegel "it is necessary that there be a leap to the Christian religion"(288). There is no room for leaps in dialectical logic. Yet, at the same time, l.auer favors Hegel over obscurantist supernaturalism or evasive "Tillichianism" when he says: "A divine person who has nothing in common with the human person would be neither person nor divine"('~93). Is the God of Hegel a conscious person or an impersonal Absolute? Lauer thinks Hegel is close to orthodox intellectual Christianity. The Ix)ok still leaves the reader with puzzles. One would have preferred a more incisive, less meandering style--but the author has raised the key questions carefully and systematically and with persuasive textual support. WARREN E. STEINKRAUS SUNY, Oswego Bernard Bolzano. Philosophi~che Tagebiicher. 18 t l-18 t 7. Erster Tell. Reihe 11, Bd. 16,1. Edited by Jan Berg. Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Gesamtau.sgabe, F. Frommann Verlag, 198t. Pp. ~46. This volume brings us one step closer to the approximately fifty-volume achievement of the Bolzano complete, critical edition (Gesamtausgabe). More than a dozen volumes, including two devoted to biography, bibliography, and guidelines for the edition, have been published since 1969. The material is organized into [our main series (Reihen). The first series contains writings published during Bolzano's life; the second , writings not published during Bolzano's life (Nachla,ss), divided into essays and journals (A. B); the third, correspondence; the fourth, documents. In the journal published in this volume Bolzano is concerned with a very wide spectrum of issues, pertaining to logic, ontology, ethics, epistemology, philosophy of religion, esthetics, and pedagogy. Extensive portions of the journal are devoted to critical reviews of other authors..Jan Berg, the editor, offers an introduction and many footnotes highlighting the significance of the text both within Bolzano's own development and with regard to the history of ideas at large. Within the limits of this review it is not possible to even hint at all the material published in this volume. I will restrict myself to the iogico-ontological topics, in fact to but a few of them. The journal allows us to watch Boizano wrestling with the analysis of sentences and of their ontological correlates. The first reading recommended to anyone interested in these matters is a fragment from another manuscript, published by Berg in this volume, footnote z98, 164-65. This fragment dates from 181 i. Bolzano considers the sentence: "Between two points there is a distance." He begins with an analysis of this sentence in terms of a predicate P ("the distance") that belongs (zukommen: copula) to a subject S ("the system of two points"). He stresses that the copula (belonging, zukommen) should not be construed as relating a genus to a species; the meaning of the given example is not that P is a genus belonging to the species S, but rather that to each individual system of two points belongs an individ- 250 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHII.OSOPIIY 22:2 APR t984 ual distance. To avoid misunderstandings, at a certain point Bolzano proposes the introduction of "a new type of copula" ("eine neue Art von Copula," italics Bolzano's), namely the verb to have. Thus the given sentence becomes: "a system of two points has a distance." This seems to be tile first time Bolzano refers to his reduction of all sentences to the "A has b" form. If now we ask what exactly is the meaning of the new copula "'to have,'" it appears to be closer to the relation between at] individual and any of its individual properties (inherence, substance-accident) than to the relation between an individual and a concept (individual-universal). This is suggested by both the above mentioned emphasis on an individual system of two points and all individual distance, and the tact that, ill the present volume, "to have" is discussed ill the context of the notion of substance (3 l, 164-65). I took Bolzano's understanding of the sentence "between two points there is a distance" to be "to all individual system of two points belongs an individual distance." This is true, but not the...

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