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BOOK azvlzws 497 the fact, not against it. If, therefore, a hypothesis is required--an indefinitely large number of facts or as many as you please being taken into account--that constitutes the truth of the hypothesis. (448). What is interesting about this text is that it provides clear evidence that Peirce knew the difference between the correspondence theory of truth and the coherence theory of truth, that he was not simply opting for coherence (or some form of it) as the cr/ter/on for truth defined in terms of correspondence, and that Peirce's frequent subsequent repetition of this position' cannot be ignored in presenting a final assessment of Peirce's views on truth and reality. Finally, this volume is persuasive in indicating the degree to which Peirce was convinced that logic and everything that comes of it is a function of our understanding of the nature of signs. The volume closes with Peirce's semeiotic gestures in seeking a method for deriving the Categories. I do have one suggestion in the interest of bettering the edition. Somewhere this edition should indicate what papers or works were left out and were published in The Collected Papers. After all, even if we grant that, ceterisparibus, a chronological edition of Peirce's works is better than a nonchronological edition, scholars will need to know whether there are any relevant writings in the non-chronological edition that do not appear in the chronological edition. If the chronological edition contained all the papers published in The CollectedPapers (minus the editing), then the scholar would need only this new edition. But if The CollectedPapers contain writings that are not in this new edition, then the scholar will need to have both editions on hand. Of course, with both editions on hand one would be able to find out what is left out of each and whether the oversight is important. But Peirce scholarship would be advanced if this edition could minimize the drudgery involved by issuing an appendix indicating what items were not included but which appeared in The Collected Papers. As a matter of fact, this could be done simply by making the suitable notations in the appendices that indicate all the papers left out of each volume. In the end, when all is said and done, it may well be that the remaining volumes of this critical edition will reveal a Peirce the likes of which is yet to be appreciated by even the best of scholars. I suspect that we are entering a new age of Peirce scholarship and for that the philosophical community owes a deep debt of gratitude to all the editors and advisors of this edition, hut especially to Max Fisch. ROBERT ALMEDER Georgia State University Gtinter Wohlfart, Der Augenblick: Zeit und ~thetische Erfahrung bei Kant, Hegel, Nietzsche und Heidegger mit einem Exkurs zu Proust. Freiburg/Munich: Verlag Karl Alber, 1982. NP. The main theme of this book is the idea that time can be suspended in a momentary or instantaneous aesthetic experience. While explicating the meaning of such an Augenblick in the thought of four major German philosophers, the author deals with many other interesting topics such as the relation between time and aesthetic com- 498 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 22:4 OCT 1984 prehension in Kant, time and eternity in Hegel and Nietzsche, and, finally, time and the origin of language in Heidegger. There is also an appendix on the moment of recollection in Proust. The chapter on Kant, the longest in the book, contains a provocative interpretation which denies Kant's claim that time is an intuition rather than a concept. Because Kant does refer occasionally to time as a Begriff (concept) (KdrV A3o/B46 ) and as the lnbegriff alles Daseins (quintessence of all existence) (KdrV A215/B~6~), Wohlfart argues that time is really a concept--a concept of reason, not of understanding (3~). According to Wohlfart, the infinitude of Kant's concept of time entails that it cannot be intuited as given (gegeben) and must be projected as a task (aufgegeben) like an idea of reason. But to say that time cannot be intuited as an infinite whole does not...


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