Carnap's Early Conventionalism. An Inquiry into the Historical Background of the Vienna Circle (review)

43 ~ JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY Z4:3 JULY 1986 Edmund Runggaldier. Carnap's Early Conventionalism. An Inquiry into the Historical Background of the Vienna Circle. Studien zur 6sterreichischen Philosophie, Vol. 7. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1984. Pp. 144. Paper, $18.5o. This book is a version of its author's doctoral dissertation. As such it is very good, but the standards for a book are higher or at least different from those for dissertations. Even so the work makes a useful contribution. It discusses important and often untouched material in a lucid, accessible style. The first of its two parts discusses what it calls Carnap's early minor works. There are two chapters on Der Raura, Carnap's own dissertation, one chapter on 'the given' in German philosophy prior to Carnap, and one chapter each for four of Carnap's shorter pre-AuJbau works. The second part of the book provides comments on aspects of the Aufbau itself and discussion of many of the most important works concerning the Aufbau. In doing this, Runggaldier has performed a service. The works are substantively and historically important, and it is a scandal that the pre-Aufbau works remain untranslated. Indeed, except for brief discussions of/~er Raum, they have remained almost wholly undiscussed. Not only are the early works revealing items in the output of one of this century's most influential philosophic figures; not only are they extensively concerned with conventionalism (the key to Carnap's whole epistemology); but they have been enormously influential works as well. PhysikalischeBegriffsbildung, for example, is basic for Hempers Fundamentals of ConceptFormation in Empirical Science' and for parts of Quine's "Ontological Reduction and the World of Numbers."' Indeed , there is no need for Runggaldier to call them minor works. The chief defect of the discussion is that it is far too narrow. For example, there is too little comparison either with other philosophers of the time or with Carnap's own later work. The chapter on the 'given' as historical background is disappointingly brief and unilluminating; it contains, besides an opening paragraph, five paragraphs on Mach, one on Avenarius, one on Ziehen, and two on Schlick. This skimpy historical background for its subject may suggest that the book's subtitle is in error, but the Aufbau and the other Carnap works discussed were written before Carnap joined the Vienna Circle and hence themselves form part of the Circle's historical background. The lack of comparison with the later Carnap is equally serious. If Runggaldier thinks that Carnap's early and later conventionalism differ, he should provide an appropriate comparison. If he thinks Carnap's conventionalism of this period is not unique, then there is no reason to confine his attention to this period. Finally, there is (deliberately and explicidy) no discussion of conventionalism in the context of Carnap's view on logic and mathematics. Given the enormous importance that Carnap attached to these subjects and the central role he assigned convention there, it is hard to justify Runggaldier's omission. ' Carl G. Hempel, Fundamentahof ConceptFormationin EmpiricalScience,(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 195z). 9 W. V. O. Quine, "Ontological Reduction and the World of Numbers,"Journd ofPhilosophy , 61, zo9-16. BOOK Rrvlzws 43a There is, moreover, a methodological point to be made. Runggaldier approaches each text with the question: how conventionalist is this work? This suggests an aim to rank order works in terms of their degrees of conventionalism. In fact his project is more interesting. What Runggaldier wants to know is: where, for each work, does Carnap draw the distinction within our body of belief between what is given in experience and what we construct through convention. If Runggaldier were considering how Carnap's views changed on this issue or explaining such changes, the answers to such a question would be interesting. Unfortunately, he argues for no such thesis and explains no such change. But set all this aside: Suppose we are interested in where Carnap draws a boundary between the given and the conventional . Runggaldier's arguments would not show us. Carnap might merely be making the assumption that a specific feature is given for no more than the heuristic purpose of strengthening his...