Hutcheson on the Higher and Lower Pleasures

Hutcheson on the Higher and Lower Pleasures MARK STRASSER FRANCISHUTCHESON,noted moral sense theorist, offers an account of higher and lower pleasures in which he distinguishes among four different types of pleasures. He claims that any of the pleasures of a higher type are both qualitatively and quantitatively better than any of the pleasures in any of the lower types. Thus, the pleasures of the second lowest class are both quantitatively and qualitatively better than any of the pleasures in the lowest class, while the pleasures of the highest class are both quantitatively and qualitatively better than any of the pleasures in any of the other three classes. Hutcheson does not, contrary to what some would expect, establish the ordering of pleasures by simply looking at what the individual finds most pleasing, nor does he do it by simply looking at what the individual's conscience indicates should be the most enjoyable pleasure. Rather, Hutcheson bases his decision on what a 'knowledgeable' judge would say, a knowledgeable judge who both has experienced all of the pleasures under consideration and who understands and appreciates the primary importance of the principle of utility. 1. Hutcheson distinguishes among the following pleasures: (l) "pleasures of the external senses [which] are of two classes; those of the palate, and those between the sexes.''1 (2) "pleasures of the imagination in the grandeur and elegance of living, and the perceptions of beauty and harmony, to which we may add those of l FrancisHutcheson,A System of Moral Philosophy (henceforthreferred to as System), (New York: Augustus M. Kelley, x969), 1~2. Here, I have not followedHutcheson'spractice of capitalizing practicallyevery noun. In all quotationsin this paper, words are capitalizedor italicizedonlywhentheirbeingso helpsto clarifythe meaning. [517] 518 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 25:4 OCT 1987 the ingenious arts, and knowledge. ''2 He suggests, "We have a pleasure... in beholding the effects of art and design, in any ingenious machinery adapted to valuable purposes, in any utensil well fitted for its end .... We have delight in exercising our own rational, inventive, and active powers, we are pleased to behold the like exercises of others, and the artful effects of them. ''3 These pleasures are those which Mill will later call the mental or higher pleasures. (3) "pleasures of the sympathetic kind, TM that is, pleasures which arise from our seeing others who are happy. (4) moral pleasures which arise "from the consciousness of good affections and actions. ''5 Hutcheson argues that the higher pleasures are better both quantitatively and qualitatively (that is, both in degree and in kind) than are any of the lower pleasures. Comparisons of pleasures involve comparisons of both the dignity and the duration of the pleasures, "dignity denoting the excellence of the kind, when [pleasures] of different kinds are compared, and the intenseness of the sensations when we compare those of the same kind. ''6 For instance, insofar as one is comparing the pleasures of reading poetry with the pleasures of reading philosophy, one will compare the intensities and durations of the two pleasures; that which is deeper and longer-lasting is the better pleasure. "Better" in this case denotes a quantitative but not a qualitative difference. As the two pleasures are within the same category, one pleasure is not qualitatively better than the other. 7 In cases involving a comparison of pleasures of different types, Hutcheson claims that there are qualitative differences. He wants "to prevent any imagination that the inferior sensation of the lower kinds with sufficient Ibid., 127-28. Ibid., 16. 4 Ibid., 129. Ibid., 131. 6 Ibid., 119. 7 Hutcheson does not explain how to evaluate intensity versus duration. For instance, he does not explain whether 75 intensity units for a duration of lo minutes is better than 4~ intensity units for a duration of ~o minutes. One might wellclaimthat the product of intensity and duration is not an accurate indication of the worth of a pleasure. For instance, a half unit of pleasure intensity might seem so insignificant that it, even if of twenty hours duration, would not be preferable to four units of pleasure intensity of two hours duration. Hutcheson suggests that the "value of any pleasure is...