Is Hume an Internalist?

Is Hume an Internalist? CHARLOTTE BROWN INTRODUCTION Should the justification and explanation of morality be sought in the passions and sentiments of human beings? David Hume answered in the affirmative because he thought that only then can we explain how moral concepts and considerations are action-guiding, influencing choice and action. Failure to be persuaded by moral considerations is, Hume claims, not simply a matter of failing to be persuaded to acknowledge such considerations but also failing to be persuaded to act on them. The point of appealing to passions is that they provide us with interests and concerns and so are capable of moving us. Thus, Hume locates morality directly in particular feelings--the moral sentiments of approval and disapproval. I shall argue, however, that Hume fails in an important respect to show that moral concepts influence action. For I shall try to show that, at least as far as Hume construes them, the moral feelings of approval and disapproval do not by themselves move us. This paper has two parts. In the first part I describe in more detail Hume's argument to show that morality should be based in sentiments. Hume makes his case polemically. Our concern for morality can be explained either by appeal to reason or to sentiments. But Hume argues that rationalist moral theories cannot explain how moral concepts and considerations motivate. I call this the argument from motivation. I show that this argument commits Hume to producing a view which distinguishes him from his rationalist opponents on motivational grounds. That view is that the moral sentiments of approval and disapproval by themselves are capable of moving us. In the second part, I turn to the question of whether Hume in his constructive phase shows that moral concepts and considerations do motivate by themselves. I argue that he fails to do so. Before turning to Hume's argument from motivation and his views on moral motivation, we need to get clear about the phrase 'moral motivation' for it can be used to refer to three different things. The first sense has to do with the motives that lead us to acquire virtuous characteristics and traits and so [69] 7o JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 26: I JANUARY t988 refers to the motives that prompt us to become morally good persons. The second concerns action directly and refers to the motives that prompt us, in particular situations, to do the morally right thing. In the third sense, a motive is moral if the agent is moved by specifically moral considerations, by the thought that this is what ought to be done, rather than, for example, considerations that derive from self-interest: from an agent's appetites, likes, dislikes and so on. Consider, for example, two people who have as their purpose helping a friend in distress. One is moved by the thought that this is what morally ought to be done, whereas the other by the thought that so and so needs help. The first person is moved by a moral motive, the second by a nonmoral motive. It is important to distinguish these three senses of 'moral motive' because it need not be the case that the motives which prompt agents to acquire the virtues or to do the right thing--the first two senses--are moral motives in the third sense. Thus, for example, it is possible to hold, as Butler did, that reasonable self-love may be what prompts us to acquire the virtues, but that once we have them they are what prompt us to do the right thing.~ It is also possible to hold, as Mill did, that right action may be motivated by any motive, as long as it is a motive which moves the agent to perform an action with good consequences.~ On Mill's view, the moral rightness of an action is determined solely by its outcome judged by the utility principle. The motives which prompt agents to perform actions to which the utility principle directs them have nothing to do with whether the actions are right or wrong. I now turn to the argument from motivation and Hume's charge against rationalists that they fail...