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336 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY ~6:~ APRIL 1988 However, the inaccuracies are much more regrettable when they are coupled with substantive claims. Thus, we are told (on 15o) that Lukgtcs "always referred with warmth and gratitude to Weber, who.., never seemed to be the object of the kind of scorn and disappointment that Simmel, Dilthey and ultimately even Nietzsche became ." This is highly misleading and clearly contradicted even by Mary Gluck's book (on 179) when she acknowledges that in August 1914, "In an unfinished article entitled 'The German Intellectuals and the War', Luk~cs lashed out against his friends," including Marianne and Max Weber, because of their enthusiastic capitulation to the general war euphoria. Lukfics's later condemnation of Weber for advocating the "historical mission of master races," in the interest of German imperialism, and for championing a version of"Bonapartist Caesarism," which earned him the wholehearted approval of the proto-fascist General Ludendorff, follow this early line of criticism, dating back to Lukfics's unfinished article of 19a 4. Thus Lukfics's sharp critique of Weber in The Destruction ofReason is fully consistent with the practical termination of a close personal relationship which occurred----on the ground of some vital principles--well before Lukfics became a Marxist. It is also highly inaccurate to suggest that the members of the Sunday Circle-notwithstanding their obvious ideological and political differences after the war-retained not only abiding ties of affection for one another but also a common ground for discourse and communication" "(9). This is sheer mythology. Once Luk~cs told me that shortly after the publication of Mannheim's Ideologyand Utopia he bumped into the author and said to him: "Mannheim, you really ought to be ashamed of yourself. It is all very well that you pinch my ideas, but you should find at least your own Marx quotations." Mannheim excused himself by saying that he did not have time to study Marx because he had to read "so much rubbish" written by his German colleagues. Comparing the works of Luk~cs and Mannheim after 1919 shows how far they were from a "common ground for discourse and communication," while Lukfics's story----or, on the other side, the always resentful Hauser's curious judgment quoted above, not to mention the position of those who after the break-up of the Sunday Circle joined the extreme right and denounced Lukfics in the crudest fashion in their writings--speak clearly enough of their "abiding ties of affection." A final word: Harvard University Press ought to be congratulated not only on account of the care given to the accurate reproduction of Hungarian titles and sentences but in general for producing a typographically and aesthetically most attractive volume, at a by no means prohibitive price. ISTV)[N M~.SZAROS University of Sussex Rainer A. Bast. Der Wissenschaftsbegriff Martin Heideggers im Zusammenhang seiner Philosophie. Stuttgart-Bad Canstatt: Frommann-Holzboog, 1986. Pp. ~45. NP. In der Einleitung dieses ausserordentlich wohl dokumentierten Buches behauptet der Verfasser, dass sich Heidegger w~ihrend seines ganzen Lebens ftir die verschiedensten Wissenschaften interessiert hat, obwohl der sp~itere Heidegger der Wissenschaft sehr BOOK REVIEWS 337 kritisch gegeni~berstand. Der Verfasser ist der Auffassung, dass es bis heute noch keine eingehende Analyse des Weges, der zu dieser Kritik fi~hrt, gibt. Das vorliegende Buch will versuchen, die Li~cke schliessen zu helfen, indem es die fr~heren Etappen der Entwicklung des Heidegger'schen Wissenschaftsbegriffs verfolgt. Der Verfasser versucht hier, den Wissenschaftsbegriffals Entwicklungsindikator des Heidegger'schen Denkens nachzuweisen, insofern dieser Begriff gebraucht werden kann, um die verschiedenen Phasen von Heideggers Denken zu kennzeichnen. Das Denken des jungen Heideggers (x917-x 923) kann als logisch-wissenschaftstheoretisch, sein Denken in 'Sein und Zeit' als tranzendental-existenzialontologisch (1923-1928), und das Denken des sp~iteren Heideggers als transzendentai-historisch gekennzeichnet werden (S. XI-XII). Bast macht einen Unterschied zwischen vier Phasen im Denken Heideggers. Die erste Phase (1912-1917) kann durch den Neukantianismus, Husserl, und die Scholastik charakterisiert werden. Die zweite Phase (1917-1922/23) kann man die des friJhen Heideggers nennen, in der sein Denken auf dem Wege zu 'Sein und Zeit' ist. Die dritte Phase kann man mit Heidegger selbst...


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