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BOOK REVIEWS 323 stand that justice for Smith is a cardinal, indeed the most basic, virtue of ethics, concerned with harm, merit, and punishment, as well as with civil law. Unfortunately such failure in understanding is typical of Teichgraeber's treatment of ethical theory throughout his book. I do not have the space to give details. He relies heavily on secondary sources and does not know when they are good or bad guides. But he is also careless in his reading. An absurd interpretation of Hutcheson on page 38 arises from taking "bad in a moral sense" (i.e., morally bad) to refer to the moral sense theory. Page 1~8 says that Smith did not, while page 136 correctly says that he did, accept Mandeville's view that vanity affords the primary motive to pursue wealth. Page 138 says that the reports of Smith's lectures on jurisprudence are "often sketchy ... in their much too abbreviated renderings"; in fact, one of them is virtually a verbatim report of what Smith said. It is a pity that the merits of the book are marred by these weaknesses. D. D. RAPHAEL Imperial College, University of London Joho Paulo Monteiro. Hume e a Epistemologia. Estudos Gerais. S6rie Universiutria. Lisbon : Imprensa Nacional, 1984. Pp. 248. Paper, NP. This volume brings together a series of studies on Hume's epistemology, published by the author between 1972 and 1978. Monteiro's main thesis, as set forth in the Introduction , is that Hume's relevance as an epistemologist may be held to lie in his criticism, not only of Cartesian rationalism, but also of empiricism. In the first chapter, Monteiro holds that Hume's theory of science cannot be reduced to his theory of induction, an interpretation which would place him among the "observationalists," who reject hypotheses. The author remarks that this would be inconsistent with Hume's own science of human nature, in which he resorts to "unobservables," like habit. Hypotheses about such unobservables, or theoretic terms, as Monteiro also calls them, are fundamental, in the author's opinion, to understand how our mind operates. His characterization of hab/t as a propensity to develop hab/ts may be considered as an interesting contribution to a non-reductionist interpretation of Hume's epistemology. What is not so readily acceptable is Monteiro's assertion that Hume's recourse to hypotheses sets him apart from Newton. On the contrary, both philosophers seem to coincide in rejecting merely speculative hypotheses, but not such as are founded on experience. In the second chapter, the author analyzes the epistemological status of Newton's hypothesis of universal gravitation. In the third chapter he refers to Kant's appraisal of Hume's philosophy. I agree with his interpretation of the latter's valuable contribution to epistemology, but I think he goes too far when he asserts that, had Kant read Hume more carefully, he would have found his theory of the a priori completely pre-figured in his writings. In my opinion, there is still too much psychology in Hume's outlook and we ought to credit Kant with the discovery of the transcendental, however near this discovery Hume may 324 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 26:2 APRIL i988 have drawn and however undeniably valuable we may estimate his contribution to the development of philosophy on Kantian lines. It must be acknowledged, however, that Monteiro's attempt to bring Hume closer to Kant is shared by several contemporary critics. In the fourth chapter, Monteiro puts forward an original interpretation of Hume's epistemology, based chiefly on the Dialogues on Natural Religion. The author argues convincingly in support of his tenet that Hume developed a naturalistic epistemology in which pre-Darwinian traits may be recognized. Outstanding among them is Hume's interpretation of habit as a means of survival superior to reason. In the fifth chapter, Monteiro refers to Hume's use of irony, especially as a weapon against ideology and censorship. To this latter subject he devotes the sixth chapter, agreeing with Noxon that Hume's strategy consisted in using dialogue form, so that dangerous opinions should be voiced by one of the interlocutors. This is followed by a series...


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