Intuition and Judgment in Descartes' Theory of Truth

Intuition and Judgment in Descartes' Theory of Truth FREDERICK VAN DE PITTE THERE IS A VERY STRONG TRADITION which maintains that, for Descartes, truth is to be found essentially in self-evident intuition. Perhaps the most direct statement of this position is provided by L. J. Beck: "The most simple and elementary truths, the primary data, as also the most complex tissue of truths, the object grasped by systematic reasoning, all owe their certainty to the characteristic mark of self-evidence which they possess for the knowing mind and, as self-evident truths, they are the objects of mtuitus or intellectual intuition."' However, even Beck occasionally makes statements which cast doubt on his commitment to intuition, such as: "truth and falsity in the strict sense of the terms are only found in judgment. ''~ The combined significance of these two quotations could only be accepted if intuition and judgment were somehow identified. In contrast to this major tradition, there have been a few commentators who staunchly maintain that judgment (rather than intuition) is the source of truth for Descartes. The most recent of these is Desmond Clarke, who states very clearly: "An intuitus is not a judgment (X, 4~o) and hence it has no truth-value (X, 43~)."s But in this work, as well, there is a certain indecisiveness. For exam- ' L.J. Beck, The Method of Descartes (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1952), 5o. Examples of the many others who share this view are: Paul Natorp, "Die Entwickelung Descartes' von den 'Regein' bis zu den 'Meditationen,' " Archiv fiir Geschichte der Philosophie lo (1897): 2o; Hiram Caton, "Will and Reason in Descartes's Theory of Error," TheJournal of Philosophy 7a 0975): 87lO4 , esp. 93; Bernard Williams, Descartes: The Project ofPure Enquiry (Hassocks, Sussex: Harvester Press, 1978), a9x-92. The Metaphysics of Descartes (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1965), 176. But intuition still holds sway on page 86. 3 D. Clarke, Descartes' Philosophy of Science (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 198~), 58. Clarke's references are to Volume lo, ~Euvresde Descartes(AT), ed. C. Adam and P. Tannery (Paris: Vrin, 1964-74). Others who share Clarke's emphasis on judgment are: Broder Christian- [453] 454 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 26:3 JULY 1988 pie, Clarke says: "Intuitus is the act of understanding, among other things, the evidendary connections between propositions. Some inferences can be explained entirely in terms ofintuitus and these approximate to what has traditionally been called immediate inferences" (69). Since inference (even immediate inference) is a form ofjudgment, an intuition which could "entirely explain" it would have to be a judgment of some sort; and thus it could have a truth-value. Once again, therefore, the intuition/judgment issue remains unresolved. Yet the resolution of this issue is of fundamental importance for our evaluation of Descartes' thought. It will necessarily determine the answer to additional questions, such as whether, or in what sense, Descartes is to be considered a foundationalist;4 and it will play a decisive role in determining the validity of what is often thought to be the most valuable aspect of Descartes' thought: his method. Paul Natorp was quite correct in pointing out (with perhaps unwarranted rhetoric) that if Descartes is permitted to use 'intuition' as a "magic word" to certify any state of awareness as knowledge, then the entire epistemological enterprise in which he is engaged becomes devoid of significance.~ This would, of course, be equally true for any method built upon that epistemology. Therefore, it is essential that the intuition/judgment debate be settled. The following pages are intended to establish that intuition is not the source of truth for Descartes, i.e., that while intuition is certainly a necessary condition for truth, it is not both the necessary and the sufficient condition for truth. 'Source,' hereafter, will mean the latter; and 'truth' is intended to mean scientia, or knowledge in the strong sense. Since intuition is more commonly thought to be the source of truth for Descartes, it is well to begin with a reminder that an excellent case can be made for judgment. Indeed, it must be remembered that, throughout the Aristotelian-Scholastic tradition, truth had always been understood to be essentially...