Descartes (review)

664 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 26:4 OCTOBER 1988 These last remarks should be treated as purely incidental, given the overall excellence and the great importance of King's book, which deserves to be placed in every philosophical library. IVAN BOH The Ohio State University John Cottingham. Descartes.Oxford: Basil Blackweli, 1986. Pp. ix + 171. $45.oo, cloth; $14.95, paper. John Cottingham's purpose is to give a clear and adequate account of the complexities of Descartes's philosophy that is accessible to students reading Descartes for the first time. He also intends his interpretation to illuminate contemporary philosophical problems . There are two primary reasons for reviewing such a book in a history of philosophy journal. One is to comment on the adequacy of the text as a guide for students. We ought to warn them away from bad books. Cottingham's book is fine. He has a unitary theme--the unity of the sciences or knowledge--and he knows the texts well and presents them responsibly. The other main reason for reviewing such a book here is to examine the commentary addressed to Cartesian scholars. Such content is sparse in Cottingham's book simply because he has done a good job keeping it on a level that will not overwhelm students. Also, particularly in the chapters on "The Material Universe," "Cartesian Man," and "The Human Condition," Cottingham appeals continuously to contemporary science and linguistic philosophy to point out inadequacies in Descartes' position. This is necessarily somewhat superficial. The chapter on "Descartes's Life and Times" is standard background, so this leaves the two chapters on "The Cartesian Method" and on the development "From Self to God to Knowledge of the World" in which Cottingham does address his scholarly peers. And despite the fact that the book is not primarily addressed to historians of philosophy, what he does say to us is of some interest. In particular, Cottingham is very clear about the fact that you cannot stop the force of Cartesian doubt simply by showing what is surely true, which is that Descartes did not intend for it to go far enough to curtail his quest for certainty. How far it goes depends not on his intent, but on the logical implications of his premises (69-7o). Cottingham also very carefully explains how Descartes equates thinking with being self-aware, so that any statement to the effect that I think I am doing anything at all is equivalent to the Cogito (38-41). Cottingham's engagement on these issues with other recent commentators is thought-provoking. But there is something more. While I was reading this book I kept noticing that Cottingham's major project--that of making a difficult philosopher intelligible on a reasonably elementary level--in itself necessarily involves the commentator in making an implicit statement of doctrine about how to approach historical figures in philosophy . So what is Cottingham's statement, what is his methodological approach, and does it merit the notice of his professional peers? Through the first half of his book, Cottingham mostly adheres to the general BOOK REVIEWS 665 principle of giving the philosopher the benefit of the doubt in an attempt to present his position as one that is logically coherent and makes sense. This principle is almost always used for writing introductory expositions, but it may in fact be quite misapplied when used to approach a philosopher with the goal of understanding what he actually does say in historical context. Among Cartesian scholars, the approach of making the philosopher make sense has attained almost party platform status as the defense of reason in Descartes. He must be allowed to proceed. Gueroult is the champion in this arena. The goal of and rules for saving (or for destroying) a philosopher or a philosophical position in effect define a great analytical game. I appreciate the virtuoso performances of some of the best players, for example, Hiram Caton's argument that Descartes is a monistic materialist. Where does Cottingham stand? About halfway through his book, on the point of remarking that if you do take the demon or the restriction to immediately perceived intuitive certainty seriously, then you may be caught...