Dialogue and Discovery. A Study in Socratic Method, and: Socratic Education in Plato's Early Dialogues (review)

Book Reviews Kenneth Seeskin. Dialogue and Discovery. A Study in SocraticMethod. SUNY Series in Philosophy. Albany: State University Press, 1987. Pp. viii + 179. NP. Henry Teloh. SocraticEducation in Plato's Early Dialogues. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986. Pp. vii + 24x. $29.95. Among the contradictions that confront the admirer of Socrates is his failure as a teacher. This self-assured ignoramus, sophistic anti-sophist, tragic comedian, and rebellious conformist is widely regarded as the paradigmatic educator--but he almost never succeeds in educating anyone. Euthyphro, Meno, Thrasymachus, and Callicles emerge practically unaltered from their conversations with him, to say nothing of Alcibiades, the most promising Athenian of his day or the jury of fellow Athenians listening to Socrates's self-defense. This failure forms the focus of Seeskin's study and an important theme in Teloh's. The questions that it raises--Why does Socrates fail in the task he sets himself?. Does the fault lie with his technique or with his audience? Can we hope to be educated any better than they?--provide an entree into these two attempts to catch the elusive, unique contribution of this perplexing fount of Western Philosophy. Both books present us with an account of Socrates's educational technique, in particular his practice of dialectic, by contrasting it with other educational techniques, such as those of sophists, poets, and ordinary citizens. In the course of describing the peculiar nature of Socratic education, the authors of necessity deal with most of the familiar contradictions alluded to above, particularly with the vexed problem of Socratic "knowledge." Overall, the portrait of Socrates they draw is similar, but they diverge widely on this topic. While I find myself more comfortable with Teloh's account of Socratic knowledge, in the final analysis I think it less successful than Seeskin's in providing a coherent portrait of Socrates. This becomes clear in their treatments of Socrates's failure as educator. The authors approach their task in sharply contrasting ways. After an opening chapter setting forth his general themes, Teloh examines each of what he identifies as the twelve Socratic dialogues in separate chapters (with the exception of the Apology and the Crito,which he treats in one chapter). Seeskin, after an opening general sketch, works up to a characterization of Socratic education, centered on the Meno, through a general contrast of the aims of Socratic dialogue with other intellectual endeavors and a specific consideration of the form and implications of the Apology. Teloh's approach necessitates a fair amount of repetition, and his style, though clear, is pedestrian, even plodding, and is filled with lists and summaries. Seeskin writes more engagingly than Teloh and with more verve and imagination, but the book is marred by innumerable typos and Seeskin's awkward commitment to non-sexist language which leads to absur- [655] 656 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY ~6:4 OCTOBER 1988 dities such as: "If a person is to become aware of his need for elenchus, she must discover it for herself" (130). The account of Socratic method on which the authors are in basic agreement is neither particularly novel nor controversial. Socrates refuses to act as an authority; dialectic demands cooperation on the part of the interlocutors; insights are valuable only if they represent discoveries that the individual makes for himself or herself; the effect of dialectic on the individual is more important than its logical soundness; for Socrates belief and action are intimately related; dialectic involves the basic belief structure of the individual and is designed to make him or her a better person; Socrates is a moral hero. Their textual support of these theses is in general sound, but their frequent citation (with approval) of such familiar accounts as that of Friedl~inder makes one wonder why they seem to think they are breaking new ground. Their analysis of Socratic dialectic becomes more interesting when we attempt to fit it to their very different conceptions of Socratic knowledge. Teloh thinks that although Socrates ironically professes ignorance (to provide space for the interlocutors to present their own views), he really does have knowledge--not, perhaps, divine knowledge, but at least the warranted belief that...