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Two Conceptions of the Highest Good in Kant ANDREWS REATH l~ KANT'S NOTION of the Highest Good has always been a subject of some controversy ., But in my opinion, it has attracted controversy of the wrong sort. Scholars disagree whether the Highest Good belongs in Kant's moral theory, or has any importance there. But these questions cannot be resolved until one has settled an issue that is clearly more fundamental, though less often asked: What is the Highest Good and how is it to be understood? What is essential to the doctrine and what is not? Commentators have tended to underestimate the complexity of the interpretive issues which the texts present, with the result that the philosophical significance of the Highest Good has been obscured . I suspect that disagreements about its proper role in Kant's moral Citations to Kant's works will give the page in a translation followed by the page in the Prussian Academy edition of Kant's GesammelteSchriften. They are included in parentheses in the bodyof the paper where possible. The abbreviations and translations used are as follows: Gl Groundworkof theMetaphysicofMorals, trans. H.J. Paton (New York: Harper &Row, 1964). Idea ldeafor a UniversalHistoryfrom a CosmopolitanPoint of View, trans. H. B. Nisbet, in Kant's Political Writings, ed. Hans Reiss(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977). [This collection includes several essays.] KpVCritique ofPracticalReason, trans. LewisWhite Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956). KrV CritiqueofPure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1965). KU CritiqueofJudgment, trans.J.C. Meredith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952). LE Lectureson Ethics, trans. Louis Infield (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 1979). MdSThe Doctrineof Virtue: Part 11of theMetaphysicofMorals, trans. MaryJ. Gregor (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1964). PP Perpetual Peace. See Idea. Rel Religion Within theLimits ofReasonAlone, trans. T. M. Greene and H. H. Hudson (New York: Harper &Row, 1960). TP On the CommonSaying: This May Be True in Theory,But It DoesNot Apply in Practice.See Idea. WO What is Orientation in Thinking?, in The CritiqueofPracticalReason and Other Writing in Moral Philosophy,trans. Lewis White Beck (Chicago: University of Chicago Pres, 1949). [593] 594 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 26:4 OCTOBER 1988 theory can often be traced to differences in interpretation that have not been clearly articulated. My suggestion is that one should be able to produce agreement about the soundness of the notion simply by finding the right interpretation . The first step here is to show that what Kant intended by the Highest Good remains an open question. Kant conceived of the Highest Good as the final end of the Moral Law, which moral conduct ought to promote in the long run. Both critics and defenders of the notion have taken it for granted that it should be understood as a world in which happiness would exist in proportion to virtue. There is also some consensus that Kant conceived of this state of affairs as occurring in another world, rather than in the world of sense. Both features have been found deeply problematic. The idea of a proportionality of virtue and happiness seems to lead to heteronomy, and it is difficult to see how to integrate an otherworldly end of this sort into the rest of Kant's moral theory. This conception of the Highest Good is indeed found in the texts. The critics have thought that by pointing to its flaws, one could dismiss the entire doctrine. However, since the texts contain another version of the Highest Good which is not affected by these difficulties, one can conclude that they have done so prematurely . On the other hand, sympathetic commentators have tended to defend the notion at the expense of overlooking some troubling textual problems. Defenders of the Highest Good must also acknowledge that there are elements in Kant's treatment of it that one would not expect to find there, and which seem inconsistent with other features of his view. This paper has several aims. I want to argue that the Highest Good need not be viewed as a theological notion, and that the proportionality of virtue and happiness is not essential to the doctrine. I will show how we may defend a conception of the Highest Good which...

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