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474 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY ~7:3 JULY ~989 entirely different from Pomponazzi's other works. The previous opposition between a rational philosophy and a super-rational faith is now dissolved. In its place we find a dialectic between two different rational arguments" (3~ 1-3o2). Questo tentativo, perb, fallisce egualmente perch6 l'analisi condotta sulle affermazioni cristiane alia luce della teologia di Tommaso d'Aquino, di Duns Scoto e di Guglielmo di Ockham rivela delle contraddizioni e insuperabili aporie tra libert/~ umana da un lato e provvidenza e onnipotenza divina dall'altro, per cui ~ assolutamente impossibile voler tenere in piedi un corno dell'alternativa senza necessariamente rinnegare l'altro. L'unico modo, suggerito dal Pomponazzi, per salvare ta libert~ consiste nel limitare la conoscenza di Dio e la sua onnipotenza agli eventi determinati e reali entrati nella temporalitY, con l'esclusione dei meri possibili in cui soltanto potrebbe ancora trovarsi uno spazio di contingenza per la libert~ di scelta da parte dell'uomo. Debbo confessare la mia perplessit~t di fronte a questa lettura del De fato, e anche all'interpretazione che Pine fornisce del testo di Giovanni Di Napoli su cui intende appoggiarsi. Ho scritto qualcosa, senza ancora aver letto il presente volume, discutendo l'opinione di Pine in un precedente suo articolo nella The CambridgeRenaissancePhilosophy , curata dal compianto C. B. Schmitt; non riesco a vedere questa rottura di metodo n6 la sconfessione del dualismo fede-ragione: la verit~ della soluzione stoica perdura come un filo rosso e regge interamente l'opera del Pomponazzi sino all'epilogo. La conclusione del volume forma il capitolo 5 (344-68) ed 6 un riepilogo molto denso delle posizioni dell'autore, con l'indicazione delle sue conquiste originali sulla letteratura precedente, fatta con garbo e oggettivit~. Un lamento resterebbe da sollevare circa i troppi refusi tipografici nelle citazioni dei testi latini, zeppi di insopportabili sgrammaticature. ANTONINO POPPI Padova, Universit~ David Johnston. The Rhetoric of "Leviathan." Thomas Hobbes and The Politics of Cultural Transformation. Studies in Moral, Political, and Legal Philosophy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986. Pp. xx + 234. $25.oo. Gregory Kavka. Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory. Studies in Moral, Political, and Legal Philosophy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986. Pp. xviii + 46o. Cloth, $45.oo. Paper, $ l ~-95Both books under review are intelligent, rewarding contributions to Hobbesian scholarship , although the two works reflect two different approaches to Hobbesian scholarship . Johnston's book is largely expository and closer to the history of philosophy than Kavka's, which purports to be not a straightforward explication of Hobbes's own doctrine but the best rendition of a moral and political philosophy inspired by Hobbes. Johnston claims his purpose is to show the influence of sixteenth-century Renaissance modes of thought, particularly rhetoric, on Hobbes's philosophy (ix). He laments the fact that most scholars during the last two centuries have separated Hobbes's BOOK REVIEWS 475 political philosophy from his metaphysics and theology, all of which are of a piece (xvxvi ). His point of departure, then, is the unity of these elements, a unity recognized by Hobbes's contemporaries. On the basis of his description of his project, one would expect an explicitly historical treatment of his subject. Yet it is not. Neither Grotius nor Suarez is even mentioned. Beza and Bellarmine are each mentioned once, and only because Hobbes explicitly discusses them. Johnston's book, as good as it is, would have been greatly strengthened by discussing the Renaissance thinkers who shaped the tradition Johnston has in mind. The imposing phrase, "the politics of transformation," in the subtitle, means that Hobbes hoped his views would change people's minds; that they would abandon the theological and metaphysical opinions that interfered with rationally-based political stability (xx). Johnston gives this project special significance because, he holds, Hobbes believed that for the first time since the rise of Christianity and due in large part to the Reformation the seventeenth century had an opportunity to effect a radical change in the way most people thought about religion and the foundations of government. This effort to change the way people think is a political action, to be accomplished through the use of rhetoric. Both Hobbes's...

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