Le Néoplatonisme alexandrin: Hiéroclès d'Alexandrie. Filiations intellectuelles et spirituelles d'un Néoplatonicien du Ve siècle (review)

466 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 27:3 JULY a989 Epicurus receives similarly generous treatment, with Hossenfelder and Brunschwig taking up problems in his account of pleasure. Epicurean hedonism is sometimes viewed as a fairly straightforward Benthamite theory, with the maximization of pleasure as its chief goal. However, such a view fails to explain why, for instance, Epicurus would insist that ataraxia, or tranquility, is the highest pleasure. No doubt, only someone with a competing theory of pleasure or happiness could view tranquility as the ultimate pleasure . Hossenfelder argues that Epicurus' account must be viewed in the wider context of Greek eudaimonism. Only when we recognize that Epicurus thinks pleasure must satisfy certain formal conditions (e.g., it must be complete, self-sufficient, and entirely under our control) can we begin to understand his identification of pleasure both with tranquility and with our ultimate good. Hossenfeider's paper takes an important step in reassessing the methods and goals of ancient hedonism. Brunschwig's subtle essay takes another . He shows how Epicurean appeals to the behavior of animals and children in defense of hedonism are not just crude and unthinking endorsements of naturalism. Rather, Epicurus achieves "a delicate balance between a summons to intuition and a return to reasoning" (x22). Two final papers on Epicurus take up the connections between moral beliefs and emotions in his ethics. Furley examines and finds wanting recent attacks by Nagel and Williams on Epicurus' claim that we have no reason to fear death. And in what is likely to prove an extremely controversial paper, Nussbaum compares Epicurean and Aristotelian conceptions of moral argument. She arrives at the chilling conclusion that Epicurean arguments are authoritarian, manipulative, and more suitable for winning converts than for discovering truths. I doubt this can be the whole story; however, it is perhaps easiest to conclude by letting Epicurus speak in his own defense: "I would rather speak with the frankness of a natural philosopher, and reveal the things which are expedient for all mankind, even if no one is going to understand me, than assent to received views and reap the adulation lavishly bestowed by the multitude" (S.V., ~9). PHILLIP MITSIS CorneU University Noel Aujoulat. Le N~oplatonisme alexandrin: HiOrocl~sd'Alexandrie. Filiations intellectueUes et spiritueUes d'un N~oplatonisme du Ve siOcle.Philosophia Antiqua. A Series of Studies on Ancient Philosophy. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1986. Pp. viii + 461. Paper, Guilders 156. Hierocles has been receiving a fair degree of attention lately, perhaps more than he deserves. First, there was Theo Kobusch's Studien zur Philosophie des Hierocles von Alexandrien (Munich, x976); then, in 1978, Ilsetraut Hadot devoted a substantial monograph (~43 pages) to him and Simplicius (Le Probl~me du N~oplatonisme alexandrin; Hi~rocl~s et Simplicius, Paris, 1978), the title of which Aujoulat is echoing in his present work, while challenging her conclusions; and now we have this massive tome, seeking to deliver the last word on the subject for some time to come. What is the problem with Hierocles? The most substantial problem, certainly, is that BOOK REVIEWS 467 this man is professing Platonic philosophy in Alexandria in the mid-fifth century A.D., and he appears never to have heard of the One, never mind the various refinements and elaborations of post-Iamblichean Platonism, such as henads, the noetic-noeric realm or triadic moments within each hypostasis. The man was a fellow pupil, with Proclus, of Plutarch of Athens. How can he be oblivious of all these developments? And yet he appears to be. For Hierocles, in his surviving or semi-surviving works, the Commentary on the Golden Verses of Pythagoras and the treatise On Providence, Fate, and What Is Our Power (preserved only in Photius' summary), the supreme deity is the Demiurge. There is no sign of the One, or of henads, or even of a firm distinction between the hypostases of Intellect and Soul. The Demiurge (who is an intellect), creates the universe by his will, and rules it by his Providence. The last Platonist to present a system as simple as this was Plotinus' contemporary (and fellow pupil of Ammonius), Origen the Platonist. Ilsetraut Hadot, in her monograph, argues...