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612 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 27:4 OCTOBER 1989 riguardo vorrei avanzare solo due proposte: 1) il trattato Se l'universo sia corruttibile forse da identificare con il Boristenitico; ~) nella trattazione degli scritti "omerici" dionei, come in quella relativa ai contenuti delle orazioni Sulla regalitg~, si sarebbe potuto tentare di istituire un confronto (taiora, peraltro, avviato dalla critica: cfr. A. M. Milazzo, "I1 discorso ~e~,[ [3ctot~.e~ctg [3 di Dione di Prusa e l'opuscolo ~eQ[ ~o~, xctO'~OwqQov&yct0oa3[3aotk~c0g di Fiiodemo," Sileno 4 (1978): 73-lo7) tra le posizioni di Dione e queUe del de bono rege di Filodemo. Se tra 1'1~ ed il 12 sec. fiorisce tutta una serie di studi politici (Giovanni Mauropode, Teofilatto di Ocrida) ed omerici (Tzetze, Eustazio) dionei, sulla scia anche dell'indiscussa fortuna del Troiano, "con il Dione di Teodoro Metochita ci troviamo di fronte all'ultimo e pifa cospicuo, bench6 finora totalmente ignorato, capitolo della storia della fortuna di Dione in eth bizantina" (~89). Nelle pagine conclusive I'A., sulla scia del Metochita, afferma che ~ necessario oggettivare l'antico, rivivendolo, per poterlo davvero comprendere, poich~ tra soggetto interpretante ed oggetto interpretato (ii classico) la continuit~ non ~ giA data, ma va faticosamente conquistata. Questo messaggio di mentalit/t umanistica stricto sensu chiude un'opera pregevole, che si snoda su pill piani, istituendo molteplici percorsi di lettura e privilegiando felicemente, accanto alle necessitfi teoretiche, quelle troppo spesso trascurate di una ricostruzione attenta delle vicende materiali relative alla diffusione e trasmissione dei prodotti scritti nel mondo antico; visti i risultati, non resta che sperare, in conclusione, che I'A. mantenga la sua promessa di allargare la trattazione ai tema della fortuna di Dione in et/l moderna. EMIDIO SPINELLI Rome Robert Brecher. Anselm's Argument. The Logic of Divine Existence. Brookfield: Gower, 1985. Pp. viii + 138. $34-95Few lines of reasoning have fascinated philosophers so persistently as the so-called ontological argument for the existence of God, first proposed by St. Anselm in the eleventh century. Many thinkers have imagined that they have refuted it, yet it persists in reappearing in renewed form. Dr. Brecher's neat little book is a recent contribution to the ongoing discussion of this logical and metaphysical puzzle. Briefly, Brecher's interpretation is that Anselm's argument is formally valid, the conclusion follows from the premisses, but it is not probative because the premisses are themselves problematic (4-5)- What is questionable is Anselm's initial identification of the revealed, personal God of Christianity with a supposedly Platonic philosophical concept, "that, than which no greater can be conceived" (81). Failure to distinguish the two shows St. Anselm's "naivety" (l 13). To this reader, this work is more successful at refuting currently fashionable misinterpretations of Anselm than it is at offering a sympathetic positive interpretation. The author quite rightly points out that Anselm is not concerned with what is nowadays called "logical" necessity (86) nor with necessities merely of thought or language (25), BOOK REVIEWS 613 contrary to many modern exegetes. It seems quite correct to interpret Anselm's argument as showing, from the (real) possibility of god's existence, God's real existence (lO5). The possibility in question is not logical, linguistic, or mental, but fully objective and real. The author's own evaluation of Anselm's argument seems quite unconvincing, perhaps because of some basic defects in this work. First, it lacks a sound foundation in the history of medieval philosophy, and in the technical terminology of the period. Some of Brecher's few historical observations are excellent, as when he points out the generally "Platonic" metaphysics of degrees of being used by St. Anselm, and derived chiefly via Augustine (1 l). But he offers little insight into the epistemology and metaphysics of Anselm himself, which alone make it possible to understand the argument. 'Being' in Anselm always means being in the sense of essence; it was not until the late twelfth century that existence, as an act of being distinct from essence, first enters the Latin philosophic tradition. The very translation of est or essein Anselm as "existence" is thus an anachronism. Brecher's few comments on St. Thomas are wholly in...

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