Aristotle. The Power of Perception (review)

608 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 27:4 OCTOBER 1989 For otherwise we are left with the suspicion that the Phaedrus promises us more than it can deliver, that the erotic art of dialectic is little more than mere coquetry. CYNTHIA HAMPTON Ohio University Deborah K. W. Modrak. Aristotle. The Power of Perception. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987. Pp. x + 249- $29.95. The opposition between materialism and mind-body dualism provides the framework for this interesting and informative book. Modrak is eager to defend Aristotle's philosophy of mind, his psychology, as sui generis, as providing both an alternative to preSocratic materialism and Platonic dualism and a much needed antidote to both the extreme reductivism of the identity theorists as well as the non-reductive materialism of modern functionalists. Modrak's strategy is to define Aristotle's psychological theory by distinguishing it from non-Aristotelian views which seem at first glance to be very similar to his. Some recent theories are better candidates than others. Modern psychological functionalism, the theory that "mental states are functional states of organisms, namely, states that are defined in terms of their causal role" (16), takes pride of place. Like the contemporary functionalist, Aristotle desires to combat both dualism and all forms of reductive materialism. But how does Aristotle's theory differ from his (purported) modern counterpart? In distinguishing the two, Modrak presents a clear picture of Aristotle's hylomorphic analysis of psychological (including perceptual) phenomena. Unlike the functionalist, Aristotle offers formal, i.e., intentional, features in his accounts of psychological phenomena. As part of the definition of anger (De anima 4o3a3o-31) Aristotle mentions "the desire for retaliation." This intentional feature serves to distinguish Aristotle's account from a functionalist one which characteristically defines mental states in terms of the concurrent behaviorof the agent. Futhermore, the material "part" of the Aristotelian definition of anger, that account which the natural scientist may offer, namely "the boiling of blood around the heart" (4o3a31-bl), also may serve to distinguish Aristotle's psychological theory from some more recent accounts. Here again, in his desire to guard against an extreme reductive materialism the modern functionalist is concerned to define mental states solely in terms of behavioral output and without reference to any physiological (material) state. For Aristotle, however, the matter, the material substrate in which the desire for retaliation occurs, is an essential ingredient in understanding anger. In sum, as Modrak convincingly displays, Aristotle 's hylomorphic analysis of psychological phenomena resists assimilation to even the most promising of contemporary theories. So far so good. Modrak represents Aristotle's psychological theory as an instantiation of his pervasive hylomorphic analysis of the physical universe. But, as she sees, a possible problem arises in his analysis of thinking (no,sis). Thinking is not "mixed with the body," Aristotle asserts (429a24-25). If thinking is indeed a disembodied activity, then Aristotle's holistic, hylomorphic theory is in danger of succumb- BOOK REVIEWS 609 ing to Platonic dualism. Modrak notes this clearly (117), and her attempt to circumvent this untoward conclusion is the best (and most controversial) part of the book. Modrak presents what she calls Aristotle's "integrated model of perception and thought" (13o and passim). By means of this model, according to which "[t]he objects presented in perception are indeed particulars, hut the mind is able to use sensory representations of particulars as the basis for representations of universals" (178), she believes that Aristotle can circumvent Platonism, the view that intellection is a totally disembodied activity. Relying heavily on the genetic account of knowledge acquisition presented in PosteriorAnalytics ~. 19, Modrak points out that for Aristotle perception of x and (scientific) knowledge of the species to which x belongs are not in competition with one another. As Modrak asserts, "Aristotle... emphasizes the connection between perceiving a sensible particular and employing that particular to represent the type it exemplifies" 068). Not only is sense perception the first stage in intellection, the first step the would-be scientist takes on the ladder of cognition, but the phantasma, "the internal counterpart of the perceptible qualities of an external object" (7), provides the raw material for no,sis. In this way...