A Note on Eristic and the Socratic Elenchus

Notes and Discussions A Note on Eristic and the Socratic Elenchus Recent discussions ~ of the elenctic method which Socrates employs in the early dialogues have favored what might be called the constructivist account. According to this account of the Socratic elenchus individual elenchi can establish more than mere consistency or inconsistency; they can establish that a particular proposition is true or that it is false. Despite the popularity of the constructivist account, it is my view that ' In chronological order these discussions are: R. Robinson, Plato's Earlier Dialectic, 2d ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1951); N. Gulley, The Philosophy of Socrates (New York: Macmillan , 1968), 33-73; T. Irwin, Plato's Moral Theory (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 37-1ol; P. Woodruff, Plato: Hippias Major (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1982), 136-6o; G. Vlastos, "The Socratic Elenchus" in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, ed. J. Annas (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 27-58; R. Kraut, "Comments on Vlastos" in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, ed. J. Annas (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 59-7o; G. Vlastos, "Afterthoughts" in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, ed. J. Annas (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1983), 71-74; T. Brickhouse and N. D. Smith, "Vlastos on the Elenchus" in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, ed. J. Annas (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), 185-96; M. Polansky, "Professor Vlastos' Analysis of Socratic Elenchus" in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, ed. J. Annas (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1985), 247-6o; P. Woodruff, "The Skeptical Side of Plato's Method," Revue internationale de philosophie (1986): 92-37; P. Woodruff, "Expert Knowledge in the Apology and Laches: What a General Needs to Know," Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, vol. 3, forthcoming; M. McPherran, "Commentary on Woodruff," Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy, vol. 3, forthcoming. Kraut, Brickhouse and Smith, and Polansky all argue against Vlastos' particular version of constructivism, but not constructivism in general. Woodruff's view is somewhat idiosyncratic. He distinguished between "purgative," "defensive," and "definition-testing" elenchi in "The Skeptical Side of Plato's Method." The purgative/definition-testing distinction can be found in Plato: Hippias Major. I am not sure how the three uses--exhortation, interpretation, and disproof of knowledge--for the elenchus that Woodruff distinguishes in "Expert Knowledge" are meant to match up with the three types of elenchi distinguished in "The Skeptical Side." An anonymous referee for this journal brought to my attention that the distinction between the exhortation and interpretation uses was initially developed by Brickhouse and Smith, "Socrates' Elenctic Mission," unpublished manuscript; cf. McPherran, "Commentary on Woodruff," n. 9. While "purgative" elenchi are understood nonconstructively, Woodruff in "The Skeptical Side" claims they are "never illustrated in early Plato" (27). "Defensive" and "definition-testing" elenchi do not establish that a particular proposition is false, but rather that a purported definition fails to be a definition. Cf. also M. McPherran, "Socrates and the Duty to Philosophize," Southern Journal of Philosophy (1986): 541-6o; and K. Seeskin, Dialogue and Discovery: A Study in Socratic Method (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987). [591 ] 599 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 27:4 OCTOBER I989 such an account is mistaken. ~ Individual elenchi can establish only consistency or inconsistency. The question arises, then, how on such a nonconstructivist account we are to understand Socrates's distinction between eristic and the elenchus. 3 It is this question that I want to address in this essay. Before turning to this question, it will be useful to explain briefly what the elenchus is and what it can establish on the constructivist and nonconstructivist accounts. Let us begin with the following rough sketch of the form of the elenchus: (a) Socrates gets the interlocutor to express some belief, p, usually, but not always, concerning the definition of some moral concept; next, (2) Socrates gets the interlocutor to express some other beliefs, q, r, and s, which (3) Socrates goes on to show entail the negation of the original belief, p. Thus (4) the conjunction p & q & r & s is false. 4 According to the nonconstructivist, the elenchus ends here. All that has been established is that p, q, r, and s are inconsistent. According to the constructivist, the elenchus continues and establishes that a...