Two-Steps-in-One-Proof: The Structure of the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories

Two-Steps-in-One-Proof: The Structure of the Transcendental Deduction of the Categories J. CLAUDE EVANS DIETER I-IENRICH'S "The Proof-Structure of Kant's Transcendental Deduction ,''~ which was originally published in 1969, quickly established itself as a classic essay in Kant scholarship. It is not so much Henrich's solution to the problem of the structure of the proof of the second-edition Deduction which has made such an impression as, rather, the unusual fact that his discussion of the problem as such has firmly established the major criterion for a hermeneutically optimal solution, and this criterion has set the standard for all subsequent investigations. Henrich refocused attention on the fact that according to Kant's own statements, the conclusions drawn in sections 20 and 26 respectively , which at first glance seem to be essentially the same, must be viewed as the conclusions to two different arguments, and that these two arguments together constitute the proof of the Transcendental Deduction. Thus, a hermeneutically optimal interpretation would demonstrate that the Transcendental Deduction does in fact consist of "two-steps-in-one-proof. ''~ Previous commentary had tended to consider such an optimal solution to be unattainable, and made use of other statements by Kant (from the very differentfirst edition) as the key to interpretations which, while ignoring Kant's own statements about the structure of the argument, were claimed to bring out the actual structure of the arguments which Kant presents. Such an interpretation, while not a hermeneutically optimal interpretation of the entire text of the ' Dieter Henrich, "The Proof-Structure of Kant's Transcendental Deduction," Review of Metaphysics 22 (1968-69): 64o-59. Reprinted in Kant on Pure Reason, ed. Ralph C. S. Walker (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), 66-81; German: "Die Beweisstruktur von Kants transzendentaler Deduktion," in Kant: Zur Deutung seinerTheorieyon Erkennen und Handeln, ed. G. Prauss (Cologne, 1973),9o-lo4. ' Ibid., 642. [553] 554 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 28:4 OCTOBER I99O second-edition Deduction--since it is forced to discount Kant's own statements about the proof--would be claimed to be hermeneutically adequateto the proof itself. But Henrich argues that the two most influential interpretations, that of Adickes and Paton on the one hand, and that of Erdmann and de Vleeschauwer on the other hand, are not in fact hermeneutically adequate to the text. Thus, Henrich reopens the issue, calling for a renewed effort to find what I am calling a hermeneutically optimal solution, i.e., "an understanding of the proof of the deduction that would require the two-steps-in-one-proof thesis.''s Henrich's solution to the problem of the structure of the B-Deduction has not met with the same universal acclaim as his criterion for a solution. Indeed, there has been a long series of criticisms of this solution over the last fifteen years or so. In this paper I shall examine what I take to be the most important of these criticisms, dealing mainly with those by Henry Allison (section l) and Hoke Robinson (section 2).4 I shall then develop a modified version of Henrich's position which is not vulnerable to any of the criticisms raised against the original version (section 3). Finally, I shall show that none of these interpretations can claim to be the first hermeneutically optimal solution to the problem of the proof-structure of the B-Deduction (section 4). 1. Henrich argues that the first step of the B-Deduction (w167 15-2o ) "established that intuitions are subject to the categories insofar as they, as intuitions, already possess unity.''s It thus contains what Henrich calls a "restriction," which Kant indicates both by the expression "so far [sofern]"and by the phrase "in Einer Anschauung" (B143), with its capital E, which Henrich takes to be indicative of unity (Einheit) rather than singularity, as Kemp Smith's translation has it.6 Because this restriction is made, the argument of w167 16-2o "does not yet clarify for us the range within which unitary intuitions can be found.''7 Kant then Ibid., 644. 4 Henry Allison, "Reflections on the B-Deduction," The Southern Journal of Philosophy 25 0986), Supplement: 1-15...