Self and World in Schopenhauer's Philosophy (review)

BOOK REVIEWS 503 transformative continuity between Kant and Hegel. This section involves a critical account of that development and is an excellent addition to the literature. In Part e, involving Chapters 5-7, Pippin offers an interpretation of the Phenomenology which essentially rejects the position that we are involved here in the education of natural consciousness to the absolute standpoint and the "existentialist" and Marxist themes which have often dominated the interpretation of the Phenomenology. Pippin's view is that Hegel's main objective is to establish absolute knowledge as science by "overcoming .., the possibility of skepticism about Absolute Knowledge" 003) and that to do this Hegel invents "a new form of philosophical argument." In place of Kant's transcendental deduction of the conditions for the possibility of experience Hegel gives us "a phenomenological account of the ideal development of constitutive forms of Spirit" (29x), an account which establishes the self-conscious spontaneity of thought. The account Hegel gives is dialectical, which Pippin argues is not a method showing the only possible resolution to difficulties encountered in each putative position covered, but showing rather that the inadequacies of each position are resolved in an "appropriate way" (lo8). In Part 3 Pippin turns to Hegel's Logic, concentrating for the most part but not exclusively on the "greater" Logic. In Chapters 8, 9, and 1o he discusses respectively the Doctrine of Being, the Doctrine of Essence, and the Doctrine of the Concept. In these chapters we are shown the "logical determinations" of the subject's self-definition of its self-conscious spontaneity, i.e., the structure of Absolute Knowledge. But this knowledge we gain in the Logic, Pippin again reminds us, is "an absolute or final account of what it is to know, and not a knowledge of a divine Absolute" (247). Throughout his analysis, then, Pippin has rejected any "Platonist," as well as any other pre-Kantian interpretation of what Hegel is doing and has consistently viewed Hegel as undertaking and expanding the Kantian project. There is much to be learned from this book simply because Pippin has so carefully worked out his argument. It would have been even more helpful if he had worked through the two Hegelian texts more thoroughly; instead he analyzes what he considers to be "key sections" of each of the works and makes his case on those grounds. In the matter of style, the book is written in a way that often distracts from the ongoing argument; many times the sentences are hopelessly complex in their construction . This is a fault not only of Pippin's but as well of poor editing on the part of Cambridge Press. A very good book would have been even better had the Press devoted some time to this. Be this as it may, this is a book to be strongly recommended. JOSEPH C. FLAY Pennsylvania State University Christopher Janaway. Selfand Worm in Schopenhauer's Philosophy. New York: Clarendon Press, Oxford University Press, 1989. Pp. xii + 378. $69.oo. This book is a valuable and original contribution to the research on Schopenhauer. Janaway convincingly argues that many of Schopenhauer's thoughts are not merely 504 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 29:3 JULY 1991 elements of a curious metaphysical system, but are serious attempts to come to terms with the historical assumptions from which Schopenhauer's philosophy emerged and pose questions that are relevant for modern philosophy as well. The first part of the book is a historical analysis of the genesis of Schopenhauer's philosophy, proceeding from the assumption that a proper assessment of Schopenhauer requires awareness of his intellectual context. The second part investigates Schopenhauer 's philosophy itself and in particular the parts of his work related to the central theme of self and the world. The third and final part deals with those issues raised by Schopenhauer that still have to be addressed by modern philosophy and with Schopenhauer's influence on Nietzsche and Wittgenstein. The book's title is somewhat misleading. It is not so much an account of Schopenhauer 's conceptions of the self and of the world, as it is an investigation of those strands and elements of Schopenhauer's philosophy...