Leibniz and Arnauld: A Commentary on Their Correspondence (review)

494 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 29:3 jULY 199a man. Only a few can do this sort of work, and because of their concerns, they are generous, and no threat to a sovereign. This Hobbesian conclusion, according to Herbert, anticipates our current situation in which political power and moral authority rest in modern technological sciences rather than in political institutions. Today we can see the dangers in this outcome, as well as its antecedents and benefits. Of course Hobbes could not have foreseen our situation, but it is enough of a claim for this study, Herbert concludes, if it "reintegrates Hobbes into the philosophical, scientific and political history of his own time," as a systematic philosopher in the great tradition of that noble endeavor. There is much here to chew, reread, and discuss. One might question Prof. Herbert 's interpretation of what Hobbes meant by "imitate the creation," or his notion of "opposition" in characterizing conatus to the exclusion of Hobbes's concepts of act, cause, and power--and perhaps other issues as well. What needs to be emphasized, however, is that he has given us a careful reading of virtually all of Hobbes's philosophical works, a fair consideration of the secondary literature, and an overall account of Hobbes's system, emphasizing the unifying threads. Readers interested in either the particulars or the whole of Hobbes's work will benefit by study and discussion of this much-needed and often eloquent work. CRAIG WALTON University of Nevada, Las Vegas R. C. Sleigh, jr. Leibniz and Arnauld: A Commentary on Their Correspondence. New Haven: Yale University Press, t99o. Pp. xv + 237. Cloth, $~8.5o. The exchange of letters between Leibniz and Antoine Arnauld in 1686-87 is one of the great intellectual events of the seventeenth century. In the correspondence we find two of the most brilliant minds of the period discussing pressing philosophical and theological issues, such as freedom, providence, causation, substance, and miracles. Thus it is somewhat surprising that until now there has been no extended and detailed treatment of the correspondence itself (although it certainly surfaces in more general discussions of Leibniz's philosophy). Sleigh's book, then, is a welcome and longoverdue addition to the literature on Leibniz and on early modern philosophy. His main concern is with an analysis of the letters constituting the correspondence--which was initiated by Leibniz's soliciting Arnauld's comments on a summary of the Discourse on Metaphysics--insofar as they may clarify doctrines held by Leibniz at the time. But Sleigh approaches the correspondence in the context of, and thus also illuminates, both Leibniz's broader system(s) (the correspondence plays a crucial role in the development of Leibniz's later metaphysics) and the philosophical and theological climate (including Cartesianism, occasionalism, Scholasticism, Jansenism, etc.). Two introductory chapters provide some background for understanding the correspondence , particularly regarding Leibniz's ecumenical project of reconciling the Catholic and Protestant churches. To this end, he sought from Arnauld, a Catholic theologian, confirmation that Leibniz's views on certain fundamental but disputed BOOK REVIEWS 495 questions wcrc not heretical from the Catholic point of view. Unfortunately, Arnauld was not so obliging, and immediately accused Lcibniz of undermining God's freedom and providence. In Chapter 4, Sleigh examines Arnauld's objections and then defends Lcibniz against the charge of heresy. The question, in brief, is whether Leibniz's conception of an individual substance is inconsistent with God's freedom. This turns on the issue of whether or not Leibniz's acceptance of"superintrinsicalness"--the view that all of an individual's properties are intrinsic--commits him as well to "superesscntialism ," or the view that for every property of an individual, it is metaphysically impossible for that individual to exist and yet lack that property (or, in other words, that every property of an individual is a metaphysically necessary property). Arnauld reasons that if Lcibniz holds the former doctrine, then he also holds thc latter. Hence, whatever properties an individual has it has necessarily--and this claim, for Arnauld, implies that if God creates that individual then God is not free with respect to the properties possessed by it or the consequences that follow...