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SOOK REVX~WS 599 Bruno Centrone. Pseudo-Pythagorica Ethira: I trattati morali di Arrhita, Metopo, Teage, Eurifamo. Elenchos, Vol. 17. Napoli: Bibliopolis, :99o. Pp. 323 . Paper, L 4o.ooo. In Vol. II of his vast Aristotelismus bei den Griechen (1984) Paul Moraux noted in passing (683) the need for a proper examination of the ethical writings of the pseudo-Pythagoric corpus--an edition and translation, with a full adducing and discussion of the many parallels with Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics. It is this that Bruno Centrone has now produced, as a monograph in the Elenchos series edited by Gabriele Giannantoni, who in fact directed the thesis of which this is the revised version. I am glad to be able to say that it is a most useful piece of scholarship, which admirably fills the gap adverted to by Moraux. It consists of a "historical introduction" (13-45), beginning with a survey of the status quaestionis, and going on to discuss the principles of Neopythagorean philosophy, and its relationship with Middle Platonism, Aristotle and later Peripateticism, Stoicism, and in particular with that fascinating and voluminous author, Philo of Alexandria, with whom particularly detailed comparisons can be made (a useful list of which is provided on p. 33). The question, also, of possible connections with genuine Old Pythagorean doctrine is an interesting problem, which Centrone deals with on pp. 38-41. He rightly adopts a cautious attitude. To separate what may be "genuine" from what is a product of Old Academic speculation (which itself may be more or less true to genuine sources), to say nothing of what is later still, is a task too great, I think, for modern scholarship, on the basis of the available evidence. In any case, what may be genuine is largely in the area of metaphysics. In ethics all we have from the Old Pythagorean period are "sayings" and symbola; Neopythagorean ethical writings, such as we have here, are new departures , best seen as essays in one-upmanship in relation to the prevailing Hellenistic schools. Centrone settles, reasonably, on a period not later than the early first century e.c. for the composition of these works. This part of the introduction is followed by a section on the linguistic analysis of the treatises, studying their style, technical terminology, dialectical peculiarities (the varieties of bogus Doric), and so on. The balance of the work is then made up of the texts (adorned with a full critical apparatus), followed by translations and a copious commentary . The work is completed by a bibliography, and most useful indices of Greek words, ancient and modern authorities, and citations of other works. The texts involved are (x) Archytas, On the Goodand theHappy Man; (2) Archytas, On Ethical Education; (3) Metopos, On Virtue; (4) Theages, On Virtue; and (5) Euryphamos, On L/fe--aU of these being preserved, in copious fragments, by Stobaeus in his Anthologia. The most substantial passages are those from the first work, but all contain points of interest. What Centrone's commentary brings out in a most useful way is the manner in which these authors play variations on themes of Platonic, Peripatetic, and Stoic ethics, which make them good evidence, I feel, for the state of Middle Platonist doctrine, in particular, in the first century 8.c. and beyond. In the case of Archytas' De ViroBono, for instance, we find an interesting insistence that happiness (euclaimonia)requires for its perfection not just virtue (the Stoic view), but good fortune (eutykh/a) as well. This is thoroughly Peripatetic, in so far as good 600 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 30:4 OCTOBER 199Z fortune can be equated with the presence of bodily and external goods, and it concords with Antiochus of Ascalon as well, as Centrone points out (though Antiochus liked to make a distinction between "the happy life" and "the supremely happy life," only the latter of which demanded the presence of the lower classes of good). The idea, on the other hand, found in Euryphamos' De Vita, that man's ability to raise himself up off the ground and contemplate the heavens is a gift from God, whereas his ability to exercise his will and...

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