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BOOK REVIEWS 137 sphere of knowledge, the Pyrrhonists recommend suspension of judgment, in action they advise following nature, law and custom. Their tranquil prescription leaves the mind empty, void of any heretical opinions and ready to be filled with God's grace" (254). The richness of this intellectual background, however, leads to a serious weakness in an otherwise excellent book. There is a definite lack of doctrinal analysis here. Although there are lively and sharp analyses of the philosophical concepts of Ficino, the younger Pico, More, Machiavelli and Erasmus, major concepts of other thinkers are barely touched upon. There is little on Cusanus's "coincidence of opposites" (which, say the authors, influenced Bruno), on Pomponazzi's determinism and rejection of miracles, on the elder Pico's battle against astrology, on Montaigne's fideism and Bruno's Hermeticism. An unintended result of this lack of doctrinal analysis is the reduction of the apparent philosophical originality of many thinkers. This, in turn, unintentionally reinforces the view that they are less worthy of study than their predecessors or successors. Despite these shortcomings, this volume will repay study for its rich material, emphasis on lesser figures and vast learning. Students now have an up-to-date starting point for the study of Renaissance philosophy whose excellent foomotes and bibliography will lead them to fuller philosophical treatments. All scholars of the Renaissance are indebted to Professor Copenhaver for completing the late Charles Schmitt's efforts in such a thorough and admirable manner. MARTIN L. PINE Queem College,CUNY Daniel Garber. Descartes"Metaphysical Physics. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, t992. Pp. xiv + 389. Paper, $23.95. This is a good book, and it will serve a good purpose. Garber has brought together an elaborate survey of scholarship on Descartes's philosophical physics, and he has added several interesting perspectives of his own. He has tried to resolve controversies where possible, and to display accurately the various perspectives where genuine resolution seems impracticable. The volume of material makes this no easy task. Thus, his intention to provide "a kind of handbook of Cartesian physics" (3) is highly commendable. Garber correctly approaches Descartes's work as an all-encompassing program founded on method, but he finds problems with the method. He sees the early method of the Regulae as failing because it falls back upon intuition, an inadequate foundation. He concludes that Descartes abandons this method (39-4 o, 48), and seeks a new foundation by validating intuitions (now clear and distinct ideas) through metaphysics (56-57). But this interpretation is importantly flawed. The method of the Regulae is more profound than Garber realizes, and it is already implicitly grounded in a divine guarantee, since it is founded on human nature. Also, while Garber does not see the adequacy of the method, or its continued presence through- 138 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 32" 1 JANUARY ~994 out Descartes's program, he nonetheless recognizes a curious thing: the idea of order that is the key to the early method "remains at the center of Descartes' thought in his later writings" (58). The consequences of this oversight are immediately apparent. Garber suggests that instead of a single unified science, there might be two: a separate science of mind (38), and a general science of body (38-39). Again, however, this is a misconception. Descartes begins with epistemology because he seeks knowledge (sc/ent/a). But knowledge of anything depends upon the mind, and more precisely, upon knowledge of the mind. Similarly, he grounds the method in metaphysics because it is the precise nature of the human being, as a substantial union of mind and body, which will determine how the expanded program of science can be grasped and understood. His project is formulated from the human standpoint, and if we want to understand his physics, we must approach the task from the perspective of what an integrated human being can experience and know. Instead, however, Garber is inclined to take the perspective of an omniscient observer . Fortunately, this is not always true. For example, he recognizes that Descartes sees in his own capacity to move his body the explanatory model for how we are to understand God's...

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