Aristotelian Logic (review)

130 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 32:1 JANUARY 1994 definition, "prudent fortitude" (phronimoskart~,6a). Its downfall is caused by the identification of "prudence" with technical skill. (A more detailed argument in favor of "prudence " as a translation would have been helpful.) Schmid claims that Laches conceives of "prudence in a merely technical sense~ and that he cannot "distinguish prudence from art" (123). However, it is Socrates who, in examining what phronimos means, offers examples borrowed from the technai.In other words, it is he who suggests techni as a possible model for the prudence that is courage. Since he eventually rejects his own suggestion, it is at least possible that Plato's intention here is to point to a conception of moral knowledge that is precisely not a techn/. For Schmid, the main lesson of the refutation is that it reflects "an inherent conflict in the traditional Greek ideal of honor and virtue" (123). Perhaps it does, but it is nonetheless possible that some version of the Bonitz thesis can yet be maintained; perhaps the refutation is meant to suggest a "nontechnical" conception of moral knowledge . If so, then the dialogue is simultaneously aporetic and productive. It ends without an explicitly successful definition of courage, but supplies the materials from which such a definition can be constructed. This view, which I think is plausible, varies significandy with Schmid's basic thesis. Nevertheless, Schmid's own argument is powerful and must be taken seriously. This is a fine book, rich in detail and nuance. It is filled with probing observations and clearheaded arguments. On Manly Courageshould be consulted by every serious student of the Laches. Its prose is lucid and it is written with conviction. Schmid takes Plato seriously. For him the dialogue is more than an antiquarian's delight or a convenient opportunity to exercise his academic skills. Instead, the Laches is a book that can teach its readers important lessons about courage. This reader was left with the impression that Schmid has long cared and wondered about the idea of courage, and that he has turned to Plato for guidance. His commentary is designed to help others do the same. DAVID ROOCHNIK WilliamsCollege William T. Parry and Edward A. Hacker. AristotelianLogic.Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991. Pp. x + 545. Cloth, $49-5o- Paper, $16.95. Readers of this journal may find this book interesting and useful for several reasons. First, it treats the topics of traditional or Aristotelian logic--terms, definitions, standard categorical propositions, the traditional square of opposition, immediate inference , categorical syllogisms, sorites, enthymemes, hypothetical and disjunctive syllogisms , fallacies--as they have been treated in the history of logic and philosophy. Most notably, the authors devote a whole chapter to presenting Aristotle's deductive system for reducing all valid forms of categorical syllogism to certain primitive syllogistic forms, taken as axiomatic. The authors thus present far more than just the concepts of traditional logic and instructions on how to apply them. They are concerned with the theory behind these notions and want to develop that theory accurately in accord with traditional approaches. In the course of doing this, they present copious historical BOOK REVIEWS 131 references, both in footnotes and appendices, which should constitute an additional source of interest to historians of philosophy. Indeed, the books ends with a minihistory of logic from Aristode through G6del, with mention of major contributors in the ancient, medieval, and modern periods. This book is intended as a college text. I have serious reservations about this. The book's style is extremely dry and academic. I often wondered whether students would have any interest in the concepts defined and illustrated (I fincl little motivation to pique that interest), or with how much enthusiasm they would master the rules and definitions presented, sometimes with daunting multiplicity. It would be unfortunate if a student perceived a major component of his or her logic course as simply a body of rules and definitions to be memorized and then promptly forgotten. My impression is that for beginning logic students the text is written at too high a level, demanding a commitment to the subject and a level of sophistication and familiarity...