Foundations of Transcendental Philosophy (Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo, 1796/1800 ) (review)

178 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 33: i JANUARY 1995 the idea of purgatory, and the justification for and the practice of indulgences. Since the Holy Office condemned all his works, he was "literally heretical," as Southgate says. One reason for studying White's thought and relating it explicidy to that of Hobbes, Gassendi, and others is that it illustrates what possibilities existed for alternative ways of handling the challenges of modernity. White may have been just as intelligent as Hobbes, and, but for the grace of God, might have devised his philosophy. But he did not, and his influence quickly faded. Though he was a formidable intellectual, religious, and political figure in the middle decades of the seventeenth century, he died in obscurity. His attempt to synthesize religion and science failed, and his commitment to Aristotle made his thought look old-fashioned. Thomas White is worth examination, and Southgate's book is the best place to begin. But he devotes too much space to generalities about the contextual background and White's importance and too little space to describing the actual structure and contents of White's works. A. P. MARTINICH University of Texas at Austin Johann Gottlob Fichte. Foundations of Transcendental Philosophy (Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo, x796/i8oo ). Edited and translated by Daniel Breazeale. Ithaca and London : Cornell University Press, 1992. Pp. viii + 494. NP. Although there are earlier writings, Fichte's theory is originally stated in the Grundlage der gesamten Wissenschaflslehre, or the so-called Jena Wissenschaftslehre (1794). This dense, complex, but influential work was written in a few short months as an aid for his students while teaching the material. Thereafter, Fichte's main effort was centered on finding a way to improve the presentation of his theory. His later writings contain more than a half-dozen further versions of the theory originally stated in that work. Like Kant, who twice reworked the Critical philosophy, Fichte, a lifelong Kantian, was convinced that his own position was correct although the form in which it was presented required amelioration. Fichte's earliest and, depending on one's interpretation, most productive period was spent in Jena. Breazeale's volume contains the second version of the Wissenschaflslehre , known in the literature as the Wissenschaftslehre nova methodo. This work is composed of a series of lectures Fichte delivered in Jena from a796-x799, before being obliged to resign his position in the wake of the famous Atheismusstreit. Fichte's manuscript, which he revised but never published, has been lost. All that we have are the notes taken by two students in Fichte's course. Both sets of notes have been carefully collated and translated by Daniel Breazeale, the preeminent Fichte scholar working in English at present. The translation is accurate and reads very well. In addition, Breazeale has provided a fine editor's introduction, a useful account of the principles of the edition and translation, and notes to record variant readings and clarify obscure points. Fichte's reaction to the Critical philosophy, strongly influential on the young BOOK REVIEWS 179 Schelling and the young Hegel, was a main factor in the evolution of the post-Kantian phase of German idealism. This volume will be interesting to anyone concerned with the development of this movement, especially for those concerned with the genesis of Fichte's theory. Although perhaps not crucial for the latter, it is certainly important and has recently provoked debate among Fichte scholars (e.g. Masullo, Renaut, Druet, Radrizzani, Pareyson). As compared to the Jena Wissenschaftslehre,this version is written in a livelier style. There are also a number of substantive changes. Fichte here abandons his Kantian distinction between theoretical and practical philosophy. In a refreshing change from the modern concentration on the object from an epistemological perspective, including the Kantian thing-in-itself, Fichte says quite clearly that transcendental idealism is focused on the subject. This translates into a theory of self-consciousness understood as the ground of consciousness, or an intelligible world as the ground of the empirical world. The idea of freedom is much in evidence in the effort to understand the subject as both self-determining and determined. Although Fichte objects to Kant's failure to...