Substances and Universals in Aristotle's Metaphysics (review)

292 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 34:2 APRIL ~996 Huffman gives an excellent discussion of Philolaus' place in the development of Presocratic discussions of archai and hypotheses; and he reconstructs Philolaus' cosmogony and embryology, showing how Philolaus generates the cosmos and individual living things within it from analogous principles, the central fire of the cosmos and the vital heat of an animal. Huffman places Philolaus' "literally eccentric world-view" (with the earth and sun both orbiting the central fire) in the context of this cosmogony, while at the same time vindicating its mathematical good sense. Huffman's reconstruction of Philolaus is an important contribution to understanding the Presocratic activity of writing peri phuseOs, both in reasoning to the arch~ and in explaining how the cosmos and living beings are generated from it. Restoring Philolaus to his place in the history of Presocratic philosophy helps us understand that history as a whole; though more remains to be said about Pythagoreans in general, their philosophical ideas, and what Plato and other ancient writers found to admire in them. STEPHEN MENN McGiU University Theodore Scaltsas. Substances and Universals in Aristotle's Metaphysics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994. Pp. xiii + ~92. Cloth, $39.95" In Substances and Universals in Aristotle's Metaphysics Theodore Scaltsas offers an interpretation of Aristotle's metaphysics that is both traditional and novel. On the central puzzle of Book Z, Scaltsas follows Aquinas in taking substantial form to be particular in actuality (in existence) and universal in abstraction (in the mind). The novelty comes in the way that Scaltsas borrows ideas from current metaphysics to express the interpretation , and the way in which he engages with contemporary thinkers on Aristotle's behalf. The third element is Scaltsas's detailed description of the evolution of Aristode 's ideas on the unity of substance and essence from Plato's account of participation. The central claim of the book is that the insoluble problems of interpretation, like the question of whether substantial form is particular or universal, can be best dispelled if we realize that Aristotle developed a theory of abstract objects in response to ontological difficulties. Form in abstraction is universal and hence can be the object of definition and knowledge; in existence form is particular, and is identical to the substance itself (168).Jndeed, Scaltsas claims that all components of substance--form, matter, attributes--only exist in abstraction from the substance. The unity of substance is assured by the fact that the substance has no parts, components, aspects, or constituents in reality, although we can abstract them in thought. The strongest and most interesting part of the book is Scaltsas's discussion and defense of the idea that substantial form is a principle of reidentification of the parts of the substance. The matter and attributes of a substance are dependent upon that substance for their identity. Strictly speaking, the substance does not have any parts or components, by which Scaltsas means parts or components with identities independent from that of the substance: "the items that are united by a substantial form do not retain their identity" (67). Since these items include matter and form, however, Scaltsas BOOK REVIEWS 293 needs to explain why it is that Aristotle constantly refers to matter and form in his descriptions of substance and change. Scaltsas's explanation is that Aristotle is not referring to matter and form as existing in the substance but rather their abstract counterparts. He argues that everything that Aristotle needs to explain change and individuation in substances is done by means of abstract entities (lo~). For example, when Aristotle says that there is a material substratum that persists through change, Scaltsas claims that Aristotle has posited an abstract entity. When Aristotle describes composite substance as composed from matter and form, he has posited two abstract entities. But it is certainly strange that the first metaphysical realist would rely entirely on a shadow population of abstractions to explain how things are. Scaltsas addresses the issue of realism by conceding that on his own interpretation statements about matter and form seem both to have no truth-conditions (because a substance has no parts) and to play an essential role in his...