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BOOK REVIEWS 3~3 reaction to them into account. The actual historical dialectic involving Moore, Malcolm , and Wittgenstein is a good deal more complicated, and more interesting, than the story told here by Stroll. Moving on to Stroll's discussion of Wittgenstein, I should now acknowledge that, so far as I can judge, Stroll offers a largely reliable account of On Certainty. In particular, in the best chapter of the book, on "Wittgenstein's Foundationalism," he makes a convincing case for the view that Wittgenstein, unlike Moore, separates propositional knowledge from the kind of "non-propositional" certainty concerning what "stands fast" for us and which is primarily evinced in our ways of acting. What is less clear to me is just what kind of response to sceptical arguments this amounts to: Stroll says that although at some points Wittgenstein is prepared to countenance, in a relativist spirit which closely adjoins scepticism, radical changes in what is thus certain , by and large towards the end of On Certainty Wittgenstein advances an "absolutist " position which rules out such changes. But if this is so (and I myself find Wittgenstein enigmatic on this issue), we surely need some arguments why it has to be so. But much here depends on the broader context within which Wittgenstein's position is developed and discussed. Despite noting Wittgenstein's invocation of the conception of man as a "primitive being with instincts" (OC 82 Stroll does not seek to connect Wittgenstein's position with Hume's naturalism or with the naturalism of much contemporary philosophy of mind; instead he ends his book with a diatribe against his neighbouring Californian neurophilosophers. In my view it would have been better to stick to the Cambridge context of Moore and Wittgenstein, and to look at the third tradition of Cambridge epistemology--the reliabilist approach of Russell's Analysis of Mind and Ramsey's papers. I myself think that the result of combining this kind of reliabilism with Wittgenstein's naturalism helps to provide for the latter a more secure antirelativist argument than is otherwise available. THOMAS BALDWIN Cambridge University John Ryder, editor. American Philosophic Naturalism in the Twentieth Century. Amherst, NY: Prometheus Books, 1994. Pp. 556. Cloth, $34-95. This anthology is primarily a textbook. All of the selections have been published previously, except Ryder's introduction and headers at the beginning of each section. The book's value is that it brings together under a single cover some of the best and most representative work of American philosophic naturalists in the twentieth century. Those professors who have for years photocopied articles for their courses in American naturalism should greet the publication of this anthology with enthusiasm. The volume is organized so as to exhibit numerous different approaches. The one major view which is underrepresented is the reductionist approach to naturalism. Reductionists (e.g., physicalists, eliminative materialists, positivists, Darwinian materialists and sociobiologists) will find little to either defend or gratify their viewpoint. This omission reveals something of the editor's perspective on what American naturalism is, 314 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 34:2 APRIL 1996 at bottom. Naturalism in this anthology is treated as a viewpoint largely at odds with reductionism of all sorts. Ryder attempts to set out in the introduction not so much a "definition" of American naturalism, as a field within which it is most recognizable, most characteristic, and most philosophically influential. One cannot fault Ryder's even-handed treatment, nor his decision to allow nonreductionist versions of naturalism to take center stage, for it creates a distinctive thread of thinking which can be traced through the entire volume--a thread which lends the needed unity to the book, and which will assist teachers in keeping their focus. It is clear that Ryder's chosen thread of thought takes its example from the landmark mid-century volume Naturalism and the Human Spirit, edited by Yervant Krikorian, a volume which is still in print.' As excellent as the Krikorian volume is, however, it can no longer effectively serve the needs of those who wish to teach American naturalism. Ryder's book is more than two-hundred pages longer, and seeks to organize the material more topically...

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