Hegel's Social Philosophy: The Project of Reconciliation (review)

468 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 34:3 JULY 1996 right that this distinction need not be a problem for Kant's, or his own, account. Indeed, further discussion of this could be the basis for defending both empirical explanation and a more interpretive or phenomenological understanding of events. But Hudson does not provide this discussion, and without it the "thinkability" of the free agency description is weak. Hudson himself seems uncertain at times as to how much authority to grant to this thinkability. He says, for example, in his Chapter 5 discussion of freedom, that "our first conception of freedom is a causality of reason through which we choose and act (or at leastrepresentourselvesas choosingand acting) on some maxim or law" (a65, emphasis added). Hudson's claim of adequacy for a description that does not admit of explanatory certitude demands a more complete defense. This issue highlights, perhaps, the challenges of interpreting historical texts within the context of contemporary discussions. But, despite this, the interpretation Hudson presents is carefully argued, provocative, and worthy of discussion. One can only hope that such work, which genuinely seeks to be true both to historical interpretation and contemporary issues, can be encouraged to grow. JEANINE GRENBERG Emory University Michael Hardimon. Hegel's SocialPhilosophy:The ProjectofReconciliation. Modern European Philosophy. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994. Pp. xiv + 278. Cloth, $54.95. Paper, $17.95. Michael Hardimon has written a very helpful book about Hegel's mature social philosophy--that of the Philosophyof Right and the associated lectures. It will help to dispel many common misconceptions about Hegel's way of thinking about modern society and the individual. Written in ordinary academic English, the book will make access to Hegel's thinking on this subject much easier for people who are not ready to immerse themselves in Hegel's terminology and his encyclopedic "system." Rather than listing the many topics that Hardimon's interpretations illuminate, I want to focus on his treatment--which is both helpful and, I think, incomplete--of one of the most fundamental issues of social philosophy: the relationship between individuals and society. Modern social thought exhibits a long-running dispute between the "social contract " tradition, which regards individuality as more fundamental than social membership , and "communitarian" theories (as they are called nowadays), which describe individuals as depending on their social membership for essential aspects of their identity. Hegel is sometimes thought to belong to the latter camp, but Hardimon reminds us that the Philosophyof Right starts with a conception of selfhood in the most abstract possible form (par. 5) and develops this through conceptions of the individual as the bearer of separate and particular interests, the possessor of individual rights, and the subject of conscience--all of which individualistic features Hegel takes very seriously indeed. Unlike "the communitarian view that modern people start out explic- BOOK REVIEWS 469 itly conceiving of themselves in terms of their social roles," Hardimon says, Hegel thinks that "that is where they are supposed to end up" (t62, emphasis added), at the end of a process of "reconciliation" through rational reflection, following the path traced out in the Philosophy of Right. In this way, Hegel aims to show that "it is precisely through their social membership that modern people are able to actualize themselves as individuals" (145 , emphasis altered), and as individuals in a sense that isjust as strong as any that is employed in the contract tradition. This is correct and important. But when Hardimon turns to Hegel's actual "reconciling " argument, I think that his desire to avoid Hegel's metaphysics leads him to present something that is less cogent than what Hegel in fact left us. Hardimon cites various plausible psychological reasons why social membership (in its various forms) would be difficult for human individuals like us to do without. But presumably no advocate of extreme, anti-"social membership" individualism--from Thrasymachus to Nietzsche--has ever doubted that their ideal can have psychological costs. They simply argue that those costs can be worth paying. Hardimon notes (i 58) that Hegel himself has a metaphysical argument, having to do with "spirit," for the indispensability of social membership. What Hardimon does not mention is...