Kant's Theory of Imagination: Bridging Gaps in Judgement and Experience (review)

63~ JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 35:4 OCTOBER I997 morally well or efficiently) in the absence of virtue and law were forgotten. Smith's "liberty" was transformed into doctrines of "expressive individualism," authenticity, and creativity (Muller refers to Emerson and Nietzsche among others). Muller is right to point to this paradox, even if we remain unclear as to what it is precisely in Smith's own theory of moral sentiments that lends itself to this inversion. The "international perspectives" on Adam Smith in the Mizuta and Sugiyama volume consist of seventeen contributions. About half of the essays helpfully discuss the reception of Smith's work in a number of countries; of these, philosophers will likely benefit most from Waszek's piece on Smith's influence in Germany (and so on Hegel), and from Donald Winch's "Adam Smith: Scottish Moral Philosopher as Political Economist," which is particularly good on Smith's appropriation of Mandeville and Rousseau. Peter Jones's "The Aesthetics of Adam Smith" addresses a crucial and neglected part of Smith's thought. "Aesthetics" (broadly conceived) is arguably key to Smith's philosophy, and supplies a fruitful point of comparison not only with the British but with the German tradition of reflection on the beautiful. CHARLES L. GRISWOLD, JR. Boston University Sara Gibbons. Kant's Theory of Imagination: Bridging Gaps in Judgement and Experience. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994. Pp. vii + 2o5. Cloth, $45.oo. Gibbons's book is a broad introduction to the role imagination plays in Kant's philosophy . In the first two chapters Gibbons works hard to show that imagination has an important role to play in both editions of the first Critique. In Chapter a Gibbons focuses on the deductions. Gibbons argues the need for imagination in the deductions is easy to miss if we mistakenly suppose Kant believes all synthesis is concept-guided synthesis. Gibbons argues Kant "draws an important distinction between synthesis and conceptualization, which suggests different roles for imagination and understanding" (18). In support of her claim, Gibbons cites A78/B 104 where Kant claims that "to bring this synthesis to concepts is a function which belongs to the understanding, and it is through this function of the understanding that we first obtain knowledge properly so called." Gibbons claims "this passage demonstrates that Kant at least sometimes wants to distinguish synthesis from conceptualizing" (18). Whether or not Kant distinguishes between synthesis and conceptualization, it is hard to see how this passage "demonstrates " it. The passage is too ambiguous to support any definite claim. This is especially true in light of the fact that in the next sentence Kant writes "now pure synthesis, generally presented [allgemein vorgestellt], gives us the pure concept of understanding" (A78/B 1o4). This is not a sentence we would expect to follow one in which Kant clearly draws a distinction between synthesis and conceptualization. Gibbons does, however, set in focus the crucial obstacle for those who argue that all synthesis is concept-guided. If all synthesis is concept-guided, then since the manifold of intuition is itself a product of synthesis there should be no special problem concern- BOOK REVIEWS 633 ing how or whether concepts apply to it. Yet Kant is concerned with just this problem. Whether or not her opponents can overcome this obstacle is something Gibbons does not pursue. In Chapter 2 Gibbons argues that Kant provides a role for imagination by carefully distinguishing schemata from pure concepts. While schemata are not concepts themselves , they enable spatial-temporal subjects to judge that concepts apply to the material of sensibility. Since Kant thinks of concepts as rules, Gibbons argues, schemata can't themselves be concepts because this would leave us in the undesirable position of requiring rules for rule-following. A further argument is more suggestive. Using a discussion of incongruent counterparts as background, Gibbons argues that the extra-conceptual nature of space and time can only be recognized through an act in intuition. That is, they cannot be grasped through concepts alone. Hence in order for a spatial-temporal subject to judge the material of sensibility, an act in intuition is required . In order to aid our understanding of such an act in intuition...