Field Metaphysic, Power, and Individuation in Spinoza

Field Metaphysic, Power, and Individuation in Spinoza

I Introduction

Spinoza developed a highly interesting metaphysical theory of nature and individuality. In this paper, I endeavor to bring forward some ideas on how Spinozistic views on extended substance, physical world, and individuality can be approached using the concept of power as the basis of interpretation. Jonathan Bennett's 'field metaphysical' interpretation of Spinoza's doctrine of one extended substance has generated much discussion, and forms the other starting point of my paper. I believe that the field metaphysical interpretation enables one to deal with the central questions concerning physical individuation — individuality and the persistence of individual being — in a rather novel way. My main question is this: what follows if physical individuals are seen as parts of a unified field of extended power?

I will begin by presenting some general features of my interpretation of Spinozistic substance and finite things as power. After these remarks concerning the basis of Spinozistic thought, I will expound the philosophical problems Bennett's field metaphysical interpretation solves and show how his position can be combined with the view that takes the ontological principle of power as the point of departure in interpreting Spinoza's thought. Following this discussion of Spinozistic ontology, I will offer an analysis of the relation between the metaphysical and physical points of view in the Ethics. Lastly, I shall explicate how the question concerning finite individuals' persistence can be answered from my position. I will argue that when interpreted using power as the key concept, Spinoza's theory of extended substance and individuality appears not only quite coherent and intelligible, but also much more exciting than has often been thought; indeed, keeping in view how important the idea of describing human existence in dynamic terms is for our philosophical heritage (one must only consider such thinkers as Leibniz, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche), these aspects of Spinozism merit our serious attention.

II Substance and finite things as power

As is well known, Spinoza argues in the first part of the Ethics that there is only one substance, namely God (E1p14),¹ and that this substance exists necessarily (E1p11). His argument for the necessity of God's existence has been much debated, and its analysis is beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, I would like to turn to the question concerning God's nature, for it should be asked what kind of being this necessarily existing God could be. That is, how can we describe more positively the being that is the cause of itself? The crucial characterization can be found in E1p34: 'God's power [potentia] is his essence itself.'² This can be seen as the cornerstone of Spinozistic dynamism, in which the nature of the necessarily existing God is power. Spinoza need not be seen here as guilty of some kind of obscurantism in the sense of presenting an occult quality of power he should rather be trying to eliminate. Instead, we should take a look at his reasons for E1p34 from that proposition's demonstration: 'For from the necessity alone of God's essence it follows that God is the cause of himself (by p11) and (by p16 and p16c) of all things.' In other words, Spinoza claims that since — as the crucial E1p16 states — things are what they are and the way they are because everything there is follows, with geometrical necessity, from God's essence, this essence is to be identified with power. Now, what is the rationale behind this? I would suggest that the identification of essence and power has to do with the fact that from E1p16 onwards Spinoza discusses the nature of causality, and he clearly finds 'power' to be a suitable term for characterizing it; talk about causality can be, as it were, translated into talk about power. To be able to cause effects is to be powerful, and therefore the all-causing God's...