Anatomiia Karibskogo krizisa (review)

Sergo Mikoian has produced what is probably the thickest book ever written on the Cuban Missile Crisis. It is an impressive study; its breadth of scope and depth of analysis mark it as an outstanding piece of scholarship. Although Mikoian makes use of research materials and books on the crisis published on the U.S. side, his main focus primarily and justifiably covers the Soviet angle of the confrontation.¹ Or I should rather say "a Soviet angle," or one of the possible Soviet angles, because in the end the book is really about the author's father, Anastas Mikoian, and his role in the Cuban Missile Crisis.

Anastas Mikoian was a ranking Presidium member and a close associate of Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev. He was perhaps the only Soviet leader, besides Khrushchev himself, who had any input in the making of foreign policy after Khrushchev had purged his political rivals from power. Mikoian's experience and diplomatic skills made him indispensable to Khrushchev as a troubleshooter in places where Soviet policies went badly wrong, as in Hungary in 1956 or, indeed, in Cuba in 1962. So, even discounting the author's personal connection to Mikoian, it is understandable that he is at the center of the story, though perhaps with some injustice to other important actors. For example, this wonderfully illustrated book features about 80 photographs of Mikoian on different occasions, compared to only about 70 of Castro, 60 of Che Guevara, 17 of Kennedy, and a mere 12 of Khrushchev.

With priorities thus placed, it is convenient to break up the narrative into four main sections: Mikoian's 1960 trip to Cuba, his view on Khrushchev's decisions to send missiles to Cuba, his recollections of the crisis, and his mission to Cuba and the United States to put out the flames in November 1962. The author makes excellent use of unknown documents from his personal archive and Mikoian's recorded recollections. He also followed his father to Cuba in 1960 and 1962 and adds his personal experiences to liven up the narrative.

The author's detailed description of his father's meetings with the Cuban leadership in February 1960 raises a number of interesting questions about the origin and the nature of the Soviet–Cuban alliance. He cites, for example, an (alas, unreferenced) memorandum of a conversation involving Mikoian, Fidel Castro, and Che Guevara, where Castro predicted that Cuba would take the socialist road in ten years. Che offered a more optimistic prognosis—two or three years (67). The author argues that Castro was in no rush to implant socialism in Cuba; he wanted time to see how socialism worked in the USSR and in Eastern Europe, and it was only U.S. economic sanctions and hostile policies that forced him to seek a stronger alliance with the USSR. The author also reflects on Mikoian's personal enthusiasm about Castro and his revolution, which reminded him of the years of his youth (71).

This enthusiasm helps explain, from the author's viewpoint, why the Soviet Union sent missiles to Cuba. He takes sides unequivocally in the old historiographical debate—Khrushchev was not thinking of the strategic balance between the United States and the USSR, even less about using Cuba for extracting advantages in Berlin. His decision to send missiles to Cuba was motivated solely by one rationale—to save the Cuban revolution from a U.S. invasion. In this context, Mikoian cites his father's recollections about how Khrushchev made his decision:

We [Mikoian and Khrushchev] both agreed that this [invasion] would inevitably be repeated, but with a different force, with an eye to a quick and full victory of the Americans. "And a thought came to me," [Khrushchev] said, "what if we send our missiles there, install them quickly and secretly, [and] then announce them to the Americans, first through diplomatic channels, and then publicly. This will immediately show them their place. They will find themselves in the condition of the same balance, as in the...