Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East (review)

Since 1945, the Middle East has been an area in which the United States has struggled to reconcile its geopolitical goals with an appreciation of regional concerns. During the Cold War, the major goals of U.S. policy in the Middle East—the containment of Soviet influence, the protection of Western access to oil, and the security of Israel—led to unprecedented U.S. involvement in the region. Yet American relations with the Middle East did not proceed on the basis of any strategic vision. U.S. policy toward the Arab world often amounted to little more than reactive responses to crises. This disjointed approach led to inconsistencies in dealing with the Middle East and contributed to the diplomatic challenges faced by successive administrations. Scholars who attempt to put these events into perspective usually do so from an exclusively Washington-centric view of the world, which tends to misrepresent the agency of the regional powers that frequently drive events in this tumultuous part of the world. Happily, Salim Yaqub's book does not fall into that category.

In Containing Arab Nationalism, Yaqub comprehensively examines the Eisenhower Doctrine, which originated as a congressional resolution in 1957 declaring the U.S. intention to offer increased economic and military aid to Middle Eastern countries and to protect the territorial integrity and political independence of those countries from international Communism, using U.S. troops if necessary. From the American perspective, the primary strategic goal of the policy was to prevent Soviet control of the region's oil. This consideration had assumed even greater importance in the wake of the Suez Crisis of 1956 and the resulting loss of British influence in the Middle East. Yaqub draws on a wide range of recently declassified Egyptian, British, and American archival sources to support his contention that the Eisenhower Doctrine also had the unspoken mission of containing and isolating the radical Arab nationalism of Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. The Eisenhower Doctrine was intended to counteract the core principles of the pan-Arab philosophy Nasser espoused, including the concept of "positive neutralism" that U.S. policymakers feared could lead to a Soviet takeover in the region" (p. 31–34). By launching a political counteroffensive, U.S. officials hoped to persuade Arab countries to stand by the United States in the Cold War. Yaqub also convincingly demonstrates that the Eisenhower administration was as determined to curb Arab nationalism as it was to contain Communism in the region.

The U.S. strategy to achieve these goals, however, may have been sophisticated and internally coherent, but, according to Yaqub, it "rested on a basic misreading of the Nasserist movement" (p. 8). Yaqub argues that the Eisenhower Doctrine was a political miscalculation not only because it overestimated American power in the wake of the Suez Crisis but also because it underestimated the power and appeal of pan-Arab nationalism and the independence of local leaders seeking to advance their own agendas. President Dwight Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles fared much better when, after finally recognizing that a policy aimed at isolating Nasser would not produce the intended result, took steps toward a modest rapprochement.

The book also examines the problems associated with U.S. efforts to counter Nasser's pan-Arab movement by relying on conservative Arab regimes in Iraq, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. Although King Hussein of Jordan—a young, pro-Western ruler—survived a coup attempt by pro-Nasser forces, the substantial public support for Nasserism made the king unwilling to support the Eisenhower Doctrine openly. One of the strengths of the book is the recognition of the importance of domestic political considerations for even authoritarian leaders in the Middle East. In addition, Yaqub explores the series of crises that roiled the Middle East in 1957 and 1958, situating them within the framework of the struggle between the Eisenhower administration and Nasser for dominance in the Arab world. This discussion underscores what Tony Smith...