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  • Fastest in the World: The Saga of Canada's Revolutionary Hydrofoils
  • Norman R. Ball
Fastest in the World: The Saga of Canada's Revolutionary Hydrofoils. John Boileau. Halifax: Formac, 2004. Pp. 96, illus., $24.95

Fastest in the World is a fascinating but ultimately sad tale. It is also instructive.

A thirty-seven-year military career as well as historical writing experience have prepared John Boileau for the task. And hydrofoils, a type of vessel in which Canada produced two world speed record holders but no significant commercial craft, have given Boileau an excellent subject.

The principle of the hydrofoil had been discovered in 1861 by English aviation pioneer Thomas Moy. Instead of applying more power to push displacement hulls through the water, hydrofoils lifted the hull out of the water and skimmed along the surface. Almost fifty years later, Alexander Graham Bell and Casey Baldwin undertook the world's first sustained hydrofoil experiments at the Bell estate on the Bras D'Or Lakes, Cape Breton. On 9 September 1919, the HD-4, powered by two 350-hp Liberty aircraft engines, set the world speed record for boats at 114.01 km/hr. The boating world rejoiced, but no commercial success followed and the remains of the vessel were left to rot on a beach.

Canada's next sustained foray into hydrofoils was driven by the military. It too led to a world record: 62 knots (114.7 km/hr) set by the Canadian Navy hydrofoil HMCSBras D'Or on 9 July 1971. Four months later, the federal government announced that the Bras D'Or would be laid up for five years while it supposedly reassessed needs. The project was dead.

Boileau feels it was the wrong step, and it probably was. Canada had the best craft of its kind in the world, with potential for sales to NATO countries. The Canadian craft would have cost $15–$20 million each. The Americans claimed they could create a proven craft – it was actually deeply flawed – for $6.9 million. The United States got the go-ahead to do further development, backed by ten NATO countries. Then the cost skyrocketed and half the countries dropped out.

For some, the Bras D'Or is another Avro Arrow story, a reflection of what Boileau calls the 'unerring [Canadian] instinct to snatch defeat from the jaws of victory.' But there is more to the story, three points that Boileau hints at, but fails to highlight.

First, modern technology must be based on solid research. Bell and Baldwin were pioneers, but they failed to consider placement of the [End Page 533] hydrofoils instead of just their design. Decades later, the Canadian Navy discovered a single hydrofoil at the front with the dual hydrofoils at the back worked better. Also, the diesel engines chosen were unreliable and undercut Canada's efforts.

Second, although the Canadians had the best technology, superior technology is not always enough. The Canadians trusted allies who didn't have their interests at heart. The British and Americans did not want Canada to develop military production capability that would cut into their lucrative sales. Canadians should have spent more time skulking in the corridors of power and cutting backroom deals.

Third, long-term R&D projects are not for the short-sighted and faint of heart. The hydrofoil story represents the defeatist attitude of 'If they place orders for it, we will build it.' The situation needed more of the attitude 'If we build it, they will come.'

Boileau's Fastest in The World rekindled the pride I felt as a young Canadian when people all around the world marvelled at a revolutionary Canadian ship. But it also raises painful unanswered questions. Why are Canadian businesspeople, politicians, and policy-makers not benefiting from some of the more obvious insights of history? Do historians have more to offer business and government than pretty books? [End Page 534]

Norman R. Ball
University of Waterloo
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