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  • Exit-Voice Dynamics and the Collapse of East Germany
  • Karl-Dieter Opp
Exit-Voice Dynamics and the Collapse of East Germany By Steven Pfaff Duke University Press, 2006. 333 pages. $84.95 (cloth), $23.95 (paper)

Many readers might think that this is just another monograph about a very specialized topic. Such a judgment would be a big mistake. The East German revolution is a unique case: The German Democratic Republic (i.e. East Germany) was the first communist country that collapsed, despite an apparently effective system of repression; it was the only country where mass migration played a major role in the revolution; it was a non-violent revolution that was not organized in its decisive phase in early October 1989; the opposition movement did never receive major support from the population; and the outcome of the revolution was the disappearance of the state (i.e. unification with West-Germany). These events are not only of interest in themselves. Their explanation is a major challenge for social science theories.

Steven Pfaff takes up this challenge. His book covers the whole process of the revolution, including the relevant parts of the history of the GDR. Chapter 1 elaborates in detail the conditions for different relationships between exit and voice, based on A. Hirschman's book Exit, Voice and Loyalty of 1970. Chapters 2 and 3 focus on the economic decline of the GDR and in its wake the increasing dissatisfaction and subsiding loyalty to the state – given strong repression and high costs of leaving the country. As a reaction a "niche society" developed: private networks of like-minded friends where discontents could be expressed. These networks "had considerable potential as vehicles of micro-mobilization." (77)

There was one "gap in the system of social control" (83) that is addressed in Chapter 4: the regime tolerated that the church provided a limited shelter for dissidents. Due to the organization of the peace prayers, the Nikolai Church in Leipzig became a rallying point for discontented citizens, which contributed to the decisive demonstration on Oct. 9, 1989. Chapter 5 provides a detailed empirical and theoretical analysis of the course of the protests.

The basic proposition of chapter 6 is that increasing exit first has a signaling effect: it is an indicator for widespread discontent and thus provides common knowledge about regime support that is not easily available in a dictatorship ("pluralistic ignorance"). Exit also leads to network erosion: those who exit weaken networks of potential activists. Which effect prevails? The degree of exit matters: if exit is low and increases the signaling effect prevails and, thus, voice increases; if masses of citizens exit the low support of the regime has [End Page 377] become common knowledge, but networks weaken so that voice decreases. This hypothesis is tested and confirmed with new data the author collected.

Chapter 7 provides a detailed explanation of why the protests were not crushed. Chapter 8 explains why the civic movement did not gain the support of the citizens: its aim was an improved socialism which was contrary to the view of most citizens. Chapter 9 focuses on the final phase of the revolution: unification. The Conclusion takes up the propositions of Chapter 1 and summarizes the evidence.

This is an excellent study in several respects: it provides a very rich and vivid account of the German revolution. It sometimes reads like a suspenseful thriller. The mixture of statistical analysis and narrative evidence from a great variety of sources (archives of the civic movement and the Stasi (state security), biographies and statements of former functionaries) is rarely found in the literature.

The theoretical innovation is the detailed specification of the conditions for different exit-voice dynamics, based on the theory of collective action. The implicit methodology is that of a micro-macro approach. Although the author never says that, he in fact applies a wide version of the theory of rational action – the underlying theory of the theory of collective action. He shows how changes on the macro level impact incentives for various kinds of actors – citizens, members of government and the security forces. Here is my only critique: it is sometimes not clear what exactly the...

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