Khrushchev's Cold War: The Inside Story of an American Adversary (review)

During the 2006 conference of the Society for Military History, Professor Ted Wilson from the University of Kansas spoke of the need for military and diplomatic historians to work together and bridge the artificial divide between the two. For readers of this journal, the truth of his comments can be found in Khrushchev's Cold War, a fine example of diplomatic and military history.

Make no mistake; this is primarily a work of diplomatic history, covering the entire Khrushchev period, starting with his ascendancy to power in 1955 up to his removal in 1964. But the authors continually explain the Soviet military's role in diplomatic decision making. For example, the Soviet military in the 1950s was wary of Khrushchev's involvement with the newly rising nationalism emerging from the collapse of the European colonial empires. The soldiers were quite aware of their weakness as compared to the Americans and feared overextending their already taxed forces. At times the Soviet military clearly expressed their disagreements with Khrushchev over defense policies which had obvious diplomatic implications. Two stark examples involved the hero of "The Great Patriotic War," Marshal Zhukov. Zhukov argued for acceptance of Eisenhower's "Open Skies" proposal allowing overflights of Soviet territory. He also disagreed with Khrushchev over the controversy concerning the Soviet navy and whether it should emphasize submarines or carriers. Khrushchev's decision to focus on submarines left him unable to threaten the projection of Soviet power during the 1958 Iraq crisis. It is the 1962 Cuban missile crisis that provides the best and most dangerous example of the interrelationship between diplomatic and military policy. Khrushchev's idea of sending missiles to Cuba was to force the United States to respect the Soviets and deal with them as equal members in the international arena. Yet it was Soviet military weakness that helped produce the Cuban crisis. For example, the commander of the Soviet military mission to Cuba in 1962, A. A. Dementyev, warned his superiors that due to advanced U.S. U-2 spy flights, the chances of getting the missiles secretly into Cuba were small. Therefore it was decided that advanced surface to air missiles must precede the missiles in order to protect them. But the limited shipping capacity of the Soviet navy meant that there would be a delay in getting all the materials to Cuba and operational, thus making it more difficult to maintain secrecy.

The book is well written and provides a fast-paced account of Khrushchev's diplomatic policies. While many of the incidents have been covered before, the authors have done a fine job of utilizing newly available Russian sources, providing even greater detail and insights into Khrushchev's decision making process. The notes are extensive and the index is clear and thorough. Readers unfamiliar with Soviet history and politics may be a bit lost, as the story begins immediately with Khrushchev's forays into the third world and there is little background provided. Still, this is a fine example of Professor Wilson's idea of what can happen when military and diplomatic history come together and it is highly recommended.