The Iraqi Perspectives Report: Saddam's Senior Leadership on Operation Iraqi Freedom from the Official U.S. Joint Forces Command Report, and: On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom (review)

Taken together, these two works provide useful perspectives on the conflict in Iraq, though they are of unequal overall quality. The Iraqi Perspectives Report,the shorter of the two works, analyses the run up to and invasion of Iraq in 2003 from the point of view of senior Iraqi officials. Produced by the U.S. Joint Forces Command as part of the Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) lessons learned process, it is a well-written, concisely edited, and thoughtful effort. Structured in six chapters, Iraqi Perspectivescovers the Nature of the Regime; Skewed Strategy; Military Effectiveness; The Regime Prepares for War; and Doomed Execution. The report captures the inherent flaws in the Iraqi regime that contributed to its rapid collapse in the face of Coalition Forces in 2003.

Two topics in Iraqi Perspectivesare worth noting, the discussion of the impact of the nature of the regime on its preparation for war, and on Iraq's military effectiveness once combat began. Perhaps unsurprisingly, understanding how the Iraqi regime prepared for and reacted to the invasion appears inextricably linked to an analysis of Saddam Hussein's personality and his desire to retain power. The consequences of Saddam's influence on the regime and its readiness for war were widespread; recurring themes include sycophantic and incompetent subordinates, unrealistic planning, ineffective forces, and a refusal to believe in an impending renewed conflict with the U.S.

Saddam's detrimental influence on the effectiveness of Iraqi forces in the face of coalition operations was devastating as coalition forces overwhelmingly dominated the battlefield; an Iraqi defeat was inevitable. Despite the inevitable outcome, there were some surprises. The employment of paramilitary groups such as the Saddam Fedayeen and Al Quds proved disruptive as coalition forces' lines of operations grew extended. The Iraqis were also able to develop simple though effective countermeasures that offset the coalition's technological superiority. While such measures could not change the outcome of the invasion, the adaptability of the Iraqis warned of excessive faith in, as well as reliance on, technology. An excellent example of Iraqi adaptation can be found in the experience of the 11th Attack Helicopter Regiment's attack on the Medina Division, which is well detailed in Chapter 4 of On Point.

In contrast to the largely dysfunctional Iraqis, the story of the U.S. Army in OIF through the collapse of Baghdad is one of success, as covered in the Army-produced On Point. Commissioned by Army senior leadership, then Army Chief of Staff General Eric Shinseki directed "a quick thorough review that looks at the US Army's performance, assess[ing] the role it played in the joint and coalition team, and captures the strategic, operational, and tactical lessons that should be disseminated and applied in future fights" (p. iii). Viewed within this framework, On Pointis reasonably successful, but the preponderance of tactical and operational-level material often obscures the discussion of lessons observed in what has become the opening phase of a lengthy campaign far different from the one anticipated.

On Pointis structured into eight chapters: Operation Desert Storm to Operation Enduring Freedom: The Army's Continuing Evolution; Prepare, Mobilize, Deploy; The Running Start; The March Upcountry; Isolation of the Regime; Regime Collapse; Implications; and Transition. Of particular interest is the opening chapter, which provides a solid but somewhat debatable summary of the Army's experiences since Desert Storm and the transition away from a Cold War...