Crisis at Sea: The United States Navy in European Waters in World War I (review)

William N. Still, Jr., has written a massive and masterly history of the U.S. Navy's European operations and activities in World War I. The work is part of the University Press of Florida's series, New Perspectives on Maritime History and Nautical Archaeology. It is also part of Still's own three-part series on the U.S. Navy's presence in what he calls "the Old World" (p. xv). The first volume, published in 1980, was American Sea Power in the Old World: The United States Navy in European and Near Eastern Waters, 1865–1917. The projected third volume will cover the period 1919–41.

Crisis at Sea is encyclopedic in scope and, except for the opening and closing chapters, is arranged topically. Every conceivable aspect of the navy's presence in Europe is covered, including personnel, facilities, health and medicine, sailors' lives afloat and ashore, relations with allies, diplomatic issues, and quarrels among Navy top brass, to name a few. Someone who wanted to dip into this book to learn about a specific topic could easily do so using the chapter headings and index. Still uncovered an amazing variety of sources in U.S. and foreign archives, using them to good effect.

The book is more than just a reference work, however. The most significant chapters from an analytical perspective are those dealing with the role the Navy would be called upon to play once the United States came into the war, how it would function as part of the Allied coalition, and how this would fit into U.S. war aims. The key figure is Vice Admiral William S. Sims who was commander-in-chief of U.S. naval forces in European waters as well as commander of the U.S. destroyer force. Sims's actual titles and the scope of his duties were never entirely clear and this created some confusion in the Navy Department as to how far his authority extended and what his role actually was. Sims, however, functioned as C-in-C even though he never received orders as such and the Navy Department seemed to accept this without actually authorizing it. Sims set up headquarters in London which became known as Simsadus (an acronym for Sims, Admiral, U.S.) and also flew his flag as Commander, Destroyer Force, on the Melville, based at Queenstown, Ireland. Sims's own view on the role of the U.S. Navy in European waters created controversy within the Navy Department because he advocated and put into practice complete cooperation with the British Admiralty even to the point of allowing U.S. ships to be part of squadrons and fleets under British command. This was unprecedented and some back in Washington accused Sims of being too much of an anglophile. Still gives Sims high marks for his performance and for accurately assessing how the U.S. Navy could best serve the Royal Navy. According to Still, the U.S. Navy's greatest contribution to the Allied war effort was in antisubmarine warfare, i.e., using U.S. destroyers as convoy escorts. Unfortunately, some of the lessons learned were promptly forgotten and had to be learned all over again in World War II.

Anyone interested in the U.S. Navy's role in World War I will find this book of immense value.