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  • Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq
  • Stephen A. Bourque
Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq. By Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor . New York: Pantheon Books, 2006. ISBN 0-375-42262-5. Maps. Photographs. Appendix. Notes. Index. Pp. xxxii, 63. $27.95.

In their 1995 The Generals' War, Michael R. Gordon and Retired Marine Lieutenant General Bernard E. Trainor severely criticized the planning and conduct of Operation Desert Storm, throwing cold water on the American military's orgy of self-congratulation. Today their account remains the best overall narrative, especially at the political and strategic level, of that conflict. Twelve years later President George W. Bush again launched the might of American power against Iraq and, again, Gordon and Trainor are presenting a less than flattering analysis of American military operations. The authors bring a wealth of expertise and ability to their craft. Gordon and Trainor have covered military affairs for the New York Times since 1985.

As in the previous volume, the authors' goal was to write a contemporary history of the conflict emphasizing the planning process and linking it to policy, strategy, generalship, and fighting. Gordon's "embedding" with several senior commands during the war and Trainor's access to policymakers and retired and active officers aided the process of gathering information and gaining a perspective on the conflict. The authors interviewed hundreds of key participants, reviewed a wide range of documents, and visited the sites of most of the campaign's battles. The result is a thorough analysis which led the authors to several unwelcome observations on the war. First, the Secretary of Defense and senior officers misread the nature of the enemy and put too much faith in modern technology. The American military was simply not flexible enough to adapt to changing circumstances on the battlefield and the senior military organization was often dysfunctional. Finally, the administration exhibited a fatal flaw in its disdain for the nation building that most thoughtful observers knew would follow anticipated victory. All of these problems, which Gordon and Trainor demonstrate in exceptional detail, contributed to the current insurgency in Iraq. The result was serious damage to our relations with our friends and hope to the nation's enemies abroad.

One should not, however, expect that this is simply an exercise in analysis. The writing is vivid and exciting and one feels they are stuck in the windstorm, fighting with the 3-7 Cavalry at Samawah, or riding in the "thunder [End Page 984] run" with the 1-64 Armor into downtown Baghdad. This is guns and bugles at its best and some of the chapters rival battle stories told anywhere. While the authors have serious differences with the military's senior leadership, they are obviously proud of the soldiers' and marines' fighting ability. The result is as insightful and complete an account of this war, up to December 2005, as will be written for many years. It is the essential source for understanding the war up to the beginning of the insurgency and should be read by everyone interested in policy, strategy, and modern military affairs. As with their previous history of the 1991 war, Cobra II will remain the standard early history of this conflict for years to come.

Stephen A. Bourque
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
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