Fighting Words

The early 1950s saw profound changes in the nature of the Cold War.¹ The election of Dwight D. Eisenhower; the death of Josef Stalin; the implementation of the New Look by Eisenhower and his secretary of state, John Foster Dulles; and the new Soviet policy of "peaceful co-existence" combined to alter the calculus of the superpower conflict. The emphasis on weapons, troops, and direct confrontation gave way to a (relatively) more subtle, global competition for the hearts, minds, and allegiance of the world. The reinvented conflict brought with it new tactics to cope with the new paradigm. Indeed, while Eisenhower titled the second volume of his memoirs Waging Peace, the president believed he needed to wage war rhetorically in order to effectively prosecute the new Cold War while maintaining national unity.² Using psychological warfare, propaganda, covert operations, and rhetoric, Eisenhower and Dulles fought a total Cold War conflict. American policymakers increasingly realized that the Cold War would be won (or lost) in the arena of public opinion rather than on a nuclear or conventional battlefield, the policy of massive retaliation notwithstanding.³

It is appropriate, then, that in The Truth is Our Weapon: The Rhetorical Diplomacy of Dwight D. Eisenhower and John Foster Dulles, Chris Tudda examines the discrepancies and tensions between the belligerent, often inflammatory diplomatic language employed by the president and secretary of state, and the more pragmatic agenda to which they had committed confidentially to ease world tensions. Eisenhower and Dulles spoke in uncompromising language about communism in public statements and in private conversations with their Western allies, the Soviets, the American (and global) public, and even members of the U.S. diplomatic corps and military.⁴ Yet Tudda claims that these bellicose statements did not, in fact, represent their true global outlook. Based on a review of their pre-administration experiences in the first two chapters, Tudda concludes that both Eisenhower and Dulles displayed a "remarkable consistency" in their Weltanschauung both prior to coming to power and during the Eisenhower administration (p. 9). Tudda contends that Eisenhower and Dulles sought to establish a strong system of collective security and achieve a "globalist consensus" that would create a peaceful international environment (p. 128). They considered rhetorical diplomacy to be a tool that would further these goals. By using strident rhetoric as an accelerant, he argues, they would create a malleable international environment ready to embrace their vision.

Tudda, who works in the Office of the Historian at the U.S. Department of State, describes "rhetorical diplomacy" as "more than mere propaganda." Instead it was "consciously designed to educate Western citizens for globalism while girding them for a long-term diplomatic effort." Unfortunately, he concludes, both efforts failed due to the "enormous disconnect" between Eisenhower's public and private discourse and his confidential rhetoric (p. 3). According to the author, Eisenhower and Dulles "squandered a golden opportunity to accomplish their diplomatic goals" as the administration's "rhetorical diplomacy overwhelmed their confidential policy, intensified the conflict between Washington and Moscow, and strained the relationship between the United States and its allies" (p. 1).

Eisenhower and Dulles used these "fighting words" even when they confidentially believed the diametric opposite would be the proper outcome for their diplomacy and in the best interest of the country. Indeed, Tudda contends that the administration's strident rhetoric, rather than helping to prevent the Cold War from turning hot, actually increased tensions with the Soviet Union and "made war more, not less, likely" (p. 126). Ironically, Tudda suggests, Eisenhower and Dulles recognized that their policies were backfiring, but refused to change them. As a result, the administration "could not free itself from the never-ending cycle of using threats to achieve diplomatic goals, which in turn impeded the administration's ability to achieve those goals" (p. 127). They were unable to implement their confidential strategies because they found themselves backed into a diplomatic corner, constrained by the "rhetorical traps...