The Korean War in World History (review)

The five essays in The Korean War in World History originated as papers presented at a symposium held at Texas A&M University. William Stueck, a leading scholar on the Korean War, provides a useful introduction and conclusion. Topics covered by the essays include the role of the Korean people in determining the peninsula's fate in 1945–1954; the influence of the Soviet Union and China on the war; the image of Korea among U.S. policymakers within the Cold War context; and the impact of the Korean War on Japan. The authors of the essays are seasoned historians who have written at length elsewhere about the Korean conflict. Their essays in this book add, in varying degrees, to our understanding of the war.

Allan R. Millett argues that the Korean people have largely been left out of accounts of the conflict. Too often, he believes, the Korean people are portrayed merely as victims of great-power machinations rather than as masters of their own fate, and he hopes to restore historical agency to them. Although Millett concedes that outside powers such as the United States and the Soviet Union were complicit in the Korean tragedy, he insists that the Korean people were "the principal authors of their catastrophe" (p. 14).

To prove his case, Millett offers a lucid account of the highly complex power struggles within both North and South Korea from 1945 to 1954. Two competing visions of revolution, each with its own internal rivals and factions, and each with foreign patrons, struggled for mastery on the Korean peninsula. By 1954 each had used the war as a platform to consolidate power but at the price of a permanently divided Korea. Thus, as Millett sees it, the triumph of Syngman Rhee's and Kim Il Sung's competing visions of revolution came at the expense of the Korean people's interests.

In contrast to Millett, Kathryn Weathersby largely discounts the notion of Korean agency. Instead, using recently available documents from Russian archives, Weathersby probes the Soviet Union's role in the Korean War. Among the issues she addresses are how much pressure was exerted by Josif Stalin on China to intervene militarily (quite a lot, she finds); the combat role of Soviet pilots in Korea (limited, it turns out); and Soviet influence in the armistice negotiations and the end of the war (of decisive importance on the Communist side, in her estimation).

For many readers, the most important question that Weathersby examines is the extent of Soviet responsibility for the outbreak of the Korean War. Relying on evidence that does not seem as clear-cut as she makes it out to be, she argues that Stalin was the guilty party. No doubt, in early 1950 Stalin gave his approval to Kim Il Sung's plans for an invasion. But his consent was hedged with important conditions: namely, that the Soviet Union would not rescue North Korea with ground troops if things went badly, and that Kim would need to secure approval from Mao Zedong. Moreover, Weathersby ignores the five years of civil war on the peninsula that preceded North Korea's attack in June 1950. The outbreak of the "Korean War" significantly expanded the scope of the civil war. Stalin was certainly complicit in, but not chiefly responsible for, that expansion.

Chen Jian draws on Chinese sources to discuss the involvement of the People's Republic of China (PRC). Chen emphasizes the importance of revolutionary ardor as a motive for the PRC's entry into the Korean War. Anti-imperialistic revolutionary nationalism and socialist solidarity were key determinants. Also significant was Mao's belief that intervention in Korea would help maintain the momentum and purity of the revolution within China.

Chen differs with Weathersby on several points. Weathersby underscores Stalin's domination of the Communist bloc, whereas Chen regards China not only as a junior partner of Moscow but also as the fairly autonomous regional leader of international revolution in East Asia. Chen...