British Foreign Policy towards Turkey, 1959-1965 (review)

In British Foreign Policy towards Turkey, 1959–1965, Cihat Göktepe provides a thorough, detailed analysis of Anglo-Turkish relations during a crucial period of the Cold War. Göktepe's meticulously researched book draws extensively on British archival sources to highlight the shifting priorities and interests of British foreign policy from 1959 to 1965. Göktepe explores how British policymakers dealt with Turkey on alliance issues, bilateral concerns, and Turkish domestic affairs. What emerges is an exhaustive study beginning with a macro-level perspective and ending with the all-important Cyprus issue. Göktepe also asserts that the British indirectly supported the partition of Cyprus in 1964 (p. 196). Although formal partition did not occur until 1974, Göktepe argues that crucial groundwork for it was laid in 1963–1964. The book begins by discussing pre-1959 bilateral relations and British policy toward Turkey within the Baghdad Pact (formally known as the Middle East Treaty Organization). Göktepe then examines British-Turkish interactions within the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO, the successor to the Baghdad Pact), bilateral relations after the 1960 military coup in Turkey, and British dealings with Turkey on the issue of Cyprus.

Britain and Turkey had competing regional interests in the postwar Near East. Britain, despite its weakened military and economic power, sought to maintain its influence and privileges in the Middle East, which British officials viewed as the second most important area for British policy (p. 11). Turkish leaders, for their part, hoped that, as the largest and most populous country in the Middle East, Turkey could, with American help, replace Britain as the dominant power in the region (p. 10). British fears of Soviet intrusion into the Near East, and Britain's need for U.S. economic and military aid, helped spur the British government to enter into the Baghdad Pact. Britain and Turkey had differing goals for the five-country alliance. Turkey wanted protection against Communist incursions, whereas the British saw the organization as a way to maintain Britain's regional influence. The British government also hoped that the resources of its regional allies would help mask Britain's growing weakness. The Iraqi revolution of 1958 led to the failure of the Pact and the formation of CENTO in 1959 as a replacement. While competing for regional influence, Britain and Turkey were able to cooperate on numerous issues in subsequent years.

Göktepe's analysis of the 1959 London and Zurich agreements foreshadows how most of the book is organized. Although Göktepe addresses several aspects of British policy toward Turkey, the main focus is on Cyprus. The book makes clear that the Cyprus issue became the main focus of Turkish foreign policy and caused tension in Anglo-Turkish relations. But the Turks were not alone in their concern about Cyprus. British officials wanted to preserve their bases on Cyprus in order to uphold their CENTO obligations and maintain British influence in the region. The Cyprus issue in some respects was a microcosm of Cold War international relations, particularly for Britain. The British and Turks were close allies until 1963 and cooperated on diverse issues such as the 1959 Treaty of Guarantee and relations with the Qasim government of Iraq. With the outbreak of violence on Cyprus in 1963, Britain was placed in a quandary. British leaders knew that the problems on Cyprus were attributable to Archbishop Markarios's misrule of the island, but they continued to recognize his government, for fear that the issue of Cyprus might otherwise spark a Greek-Turkish war and substantially endanger the southeastern flank of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Moreover, British officials were worried that the ouster of the Markarios government might create an opportunity for Communist influence in Cyprus. Britain's hands were tied, and the attempted resolution of the Cyprus issue led to a Soviet-Turkish rapprochement.

Throughout this period, British foreign policy was more focused on self-interest than on professed idealistic policy goals. Despite proclaiming a desire to promote human rights...