A Military History of Russia From Ivan the Terrible to the War in Chechnya (review)

David Stone, Professor of Russian History at Kansas State University, has written his latest book in order to accomplish two primary objectives: (1) To cover both Russian and Soviet military history in one volume for the first time, and (2) to provide an accessible military history of Russia for use by military historians.

Underlying his second objective is Professor Stone's belief that the discipline of military history suffers from a tunnel vision in which "military history starts with the U.S. Civil War, and it stretches from the Mississippi River to central Europe" (p. ix). It's his opinion that a military history that excludes the rest of the world, especially Russia, "is inherently incomplete" (ibid.).

His secondary objectives include: (1) a cursory examination of the battles, campaigns, and wars in Russia's history; and (2) the illumination of "the complex and reciprocal relationship between military and society in Russia" (ibid.).

Although arranged chronologically, each chapter in Stone's book examines Russia's struggles to overcome social, economic, and technological backwardness, which were exacerbated by the militarization of Russian society, which, in turn, was necessitated by the requirement to defend vast amounts of open territory. According to Stone, "from its beginnings, Russia has been a society organized for war" (p. xii).

Although there is little in Professor Stone's survey that is new to the student of Russian military history, it is grounded in sound scholarship. Moreover, by avoiding entangling details, Stone is able to achieve his objectives. His survey is well written and completely accessible to the educated layman.

That's not to say, however, that the book is without its flaws. For example, Stone employs the term "absolutism" to describe the rule of Peter the Great and Catherine the Great, but defines it in European terms: "Absolutist rulers sought to eliminate or disarm all domestic rivals for power, whether powerful regional elites or obstructionist representative institutions, in order to increase their capacity to wield power" (p. 30).

Yet, Stone also refers to a "particular Russian brand of absolutism" devoted to "improving the efficiency and extractive capacity of the Russian state in order to boost its power" (p. 44). Moreover, he appears to be unaware of recent scholarship on Russian absolutism, which "emphasizes cooperation between the tsar and the ruling elite and between Russia's central government and the provinces" (Chester Dunning and Norman S. Smith, "Moving Beyond Absolutism: Was Early Modern Russia a 'Fiscal-Military' State?" Russian History/Histoire Russe 33 [Spring 2006]: 39).

Stone also is quite mistaken when he alleges that President Reagan's "Star Wars" missile defense plan "terrified the Soviet leadership" (p. 237).

Nevertheless, Stone concludes his splendid history by putting it to use. He compares previous fifteen-year spans of military revitalization—under Peter the Great, under Dmitrii Miliutin, and under Joseph Stalin—with Russia's martial renaissance since 1991. Thus, his conclusion: "Seen in historical perspective, the outlook is gloomy" (p. 246).