The Dragon's War: Allied Operations and the Fate of China, 1937-1947 (review)

Maochun Yu has crafted a book which blends known facts about the period of the "official" war in China and its immediate aftermath with new materials and a new approach which adds greatly to our understanding of some of the pressures under which the war in China was conducted by the Nationalist (GMD) government. While avoiding being bogged down in reiteration of known problems, e.g., the arguments between Generals Joseph W. Stilwell and Claire L. Chennault (although these are dealt with), the author places them in a comprehensive context which has not been previously attempted. He discusses the overall foreign intelligence and military operations in China from the time of the formation of the Nationalist government to 1947. He details the aid and advice given by the Germans, the Italians, the Soviet Union, and the various Western European and American governments. His goal is to demonstrate how the presence of foreign operatives, who were not, for the most part, under the control or direction of the Chinese government, even in a cooperative mode, complicated the wartime status of the Chinese government, thus adding to its weakness in the postwar period.

Not only does Yu discuss the effects of the foreign intelligence and aid missions, he details much of the aid, its part in the various political and military operations during the period, and both the competition and gaps in the foreign efforts towards China. He includes an overview of the foreign and Chinese positions on their part in the war, and their changing parameters as the war progressed. China's major problem was its need for aid; a corollary was the need to keep open a delivery route for any aid acquired. Nonetheless Yu argues that the operations by the Soviet, American, British, and French personnel challenged the authority and legitimacy of the Nationalist government. These aid programs, special intelligence operations by the British and French, American relations with the communists, and Soviet and American competition in the China Theater, all helped to create, inadvertently, conditions which allowed for the expansion of the Chinese Communist Party during the war.

The rapid expansion of overseas personnel and agencies—aid, intelligence, commercial, military and other—undermined the appearance of control by the Chinese government. Much of the government's energy was diverted to settling problems of jurisdiction, and attempting to coordinate, or at least work with, the plethora of representatives from other countries, as well as political and other factions within its own sphere. Many Chinese became disillusioned with these developments, adding to the appeal of the communists.

The Dragon's War is a book for those interested in modern Chinese history, diplomatic and military history of the era from the late 1920s to the beginnings of the Cold War in Asia, and, of course, the East Asian area in the Second World War. Given the complexity of the topic, the author handles the information and its interconnections with great skill in support of his argument. Of additional value is his annotated bibliography giving insight into his sources.