Of Note: Egypt's Populist Bargain

Although 'populism' is not a word traditionally associated with the Middle East, examining Egyptian politics through the prism of populism may explain how Hosni Mubarak's authoritarian regime has successfully postponed meaningful democratization and economic liberalization. In the post-independence era, Egypt's leaders made a populist 'ruling bargain' with the nation's people. The leaders exchanged socialist welfare policies and economic patronage for continued political support. This bargain continues to constrain the current regime's ability to make democratic and economic reforms, while it simultaneously excuses the strengthening of authoritarian rule.

The regime's reliance on economic patronage and welfare benefits to maintain political support limits substantial economic liberalization. Even though economic liberalization is en vogue under the Washington Consensus and necessary for continued International Monetary Fund assistance, Mubarak maintains food subsidies to ensure continued domestic support. In the past, subsidy cuts led to the infamous bread riots under Anwar Sadat's regime and privatization efforts created violent protests of textile workers in Kafr al-Dawwar at the beginning of the Mubarak era. These events are powerful reminders to the regime of the importance of fulfilling its part of the ruling bargain.¹Even without the threat of riots, the benefits of populism often outweigh those of liberalization. Although Mubarak reluctantly agreed to an IMF privatization plan in the early 1990's, the plan's implementation remains limited—largely because the plan would eliminate the economic patronage system that provides lucrative public sector contracts and cheaper industrial inputs to regime supporters.²

The same forces that constrain economic reform also help the regime resist democratization pressures. By linking economic privilege with support for Mubarak's ruling National Democratic Party,³ the regime is able to coopt the opposition's agenda. This weakens civil society and entrenches the regime. Banning whisky advertisements and cracking down on Nile restaurants frequented by homosexuals are clear attempts by the regime to co-opt the Islamist opposition agenda.⁴ Authoritarian leaders in Egypt have done this in the past with trade unions and may do the same with the Muslim Brotherhood by legalizing Brotherhood defectors under the Al-Wasat Party.⁵ Also, by characterizing democratization as "foreign ambitions to erase Arab identity,"⁶ the regime can de-legitimize democratization in the domestic eye and position itself as protector of the Egyptian identity.

Mubarak is an authoritarian ruler capable of exercising power in a calculated manner. His jailing of an opposition presidential candidate, curtailing of local elections, and continued imposition of emergency laws that expand his power leave no illusions of his being a democrat. It is the populist foundations of the regime that provide the tools to delay meaningful democratization and economic liberalization.