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  • A New Layer to a Complex Problem
  • Allison Hodgkins, PhD Candidate, Resident Director
The Shia Revival, by Vali Nasr. (New York: W.W. Norton, 2006), 304 pages. $25.95 (hardcover).

Middle Eastern political and religious discourse has long filtered through the perspective of Islam's dominant Sunni sect. Now, Western audiences have an opportunity to view the history of Islam and of the Middle East through a Shia lens in Vali Nasr's new book, The Shia Revival. Nasr's eloquent prose weaves historical anecdotes and personal reflections into his sweeping account of Shia history and politics in the 'Shia Crescent,' an area ranging from southern Lebanon down to the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia, then back through Iraq and into Afghanistan, Pakistan, and parts of India. His rich depiction of Shia life—such as his descripton of the millions of ancient manuscripts in Marashi Library in Qom, Iran, which are all being cataloged into the latest in electronic database technology—open a rare window into the complex blend of tradition and modernity shaping the Shia revival.

Most recent works trying to make sense of the war in Iraq focus on miscalculations in U.S. policy or on the roots of Islamic rage against the West. Nasr, however, places the escalating civil strife in post-Saddam Iraq firmly in the context of the centuries-long schism between Islam's rival sects. All claims to promote a secular Arab nationalism aside, Saddam Hussein's regime was at the core a Sunni regime. Members of the Shia majority in Iraq were given token positions at best and were ruthlessly persecuted at worst. Upon the Shia bid to shake off their oppressor in the wake of the first Gulf War, the Sunni regime in Saudi Arabia, fearful of the implications of a successful Shia rebellion, convinced America not to come to the Shia's aid. Today's war in Iraq, according to Nasr's account, offers a long awaited opportunity for the Shia majority of Iraq to again demand their rightful share of power. In his assessment, the extent to which the Sunnis are able to adjust to the realities of Shia empowerment—not only in Iraq but also in Lebanon, Syria, Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, and Pakistan—will determine these countries' prospects for democracy, the nature of their relations with the West, and overall regional stability.

Nasr states his threefold aim in the introduction: "to explain why there is a Shia-Sunni conflict, why it has become more salient of late, and what it will mean for the future of the Middle East."1 His fulfillment of the first objective is the book's major strength. [End Page 181]

The first two chapters of the book, "The Other Islam" and "The making of Shia Politics" provide a rich historical account of the intertwined histories of Islam's rival sects and the development of their disparate traditions. For example, his detailed account of the bitter dispute over the source of the Caliph's legitimacy suggests answers to many questions about the contemporary split nature of Shia faith and Shia politics. Whereas the Sunni caliphate viewed leadership after the Prophet as a question of who could best ensure the stability needed to grow the faith, Shia's tradition holds that perpetuating the faith requires the continued guidance of one capable of penetrating the innermost meanings of the faith. Only the descendants of the Prophet are endowed the spiritual qualities necessary to perpetuate the bond between God and man. The imperative that a leader do more than simply provide good governance illuminates the source of the tremendous moral authority held by Shia religious leaders like Ayatollah Khomeini, Ayatollah Sistani or Hassan Nassrallah.

The sections of the book most illuminating of the forgotten roots of the War on Terror are the chapters on "Khomeni's Moment" and "the Battle of Islamic Fundamentalisms." In the post 9-11 context, it is easy to forget that the term "Islamic fundamentalism" burst into Western discourse as a distinctly Shia phenomenon. Nasr reminds us that the original Islamic bogeyman was not Osama Bin Laden, but Ayatollah Khomeni. One cannot help but smile grimly at the irony of how a...

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