The Kantian Imperative: Humiliation, Common Sense, Politics (review)

Saurette's alternative reading of Kant aims to bring to light the 'subterranean Kantian logic' – what he calls the 'Kantian Imperative' – which drives Kant's moral and political project. The 'Kantian Imperative' places common sense and the affect of humiliation at the centre of Kant's moral and political theory. Kant is seen as using common sense to fill the gaps in his a priori autonomy argument and as using humiliation to establish de facto moral obedience to the 'Kantian Imperative image of morality.' Saurette argues that experiencing humiliation fulfils a 'primordial role' in the formation of respect for the moral law for Kant, and Kant's position deems it both right and possible to coerce people to experience humiliation. Indeed, Saurette claims that on Kant's conception, 'strategic employment of humiliation ... [is] a legitimate mode of political cultivation' because 'the experience of humiliation [is] a fundamental precondition of citizenship, morality, and peace.' After arguing that the 'Kantian Imperative' also deeply informs the work of Jürgen Habermas and Charles Taylor, Saurette's analysis culminates in the claim that the experience of humiliation is so centrally located in Kant's theory that it can neither identify any wrongdoing nor justify the condemnation of the United States military's 'humiliating' treatment of Iraqi prisoners at Abu Ghraib. Saurette therefore concludes that we should start elsewhere when developing our moral and political theories.

Saurette's interpretation relies heavily on a passage in the Second Critique: 'The moral law unavoidably humiliates every human being when he compares with it the sensible propensity of his nature ... it humiliates us in our self-consciousness ... it awakens respect for itself insofar as it is a positive and a determining ground.' On Saurette's interpretation, humiliation is a primordial affect that enables respect for the moral law. Since humiliation is an affective precondition for morality, people can be forced to experience it. A key problem with Saurette's interpretation is that the kind of humiliation Kant talks about in this passage is entirely first-person in nature. It is one that only each individual can experience by critically evaluating his actions as motivated by natural inclination as opposed to reason. It is not a type of humiliation that can be brought about by others. Therefore, the Second Critique passage, central to Saurette's interpretation, cannot be used to support it. Rather, the passage supports Kant's distinction between enforceable and non-enforceable rights and duties as found in 'The Doctrine of Right.'

Given Saurette's special interest in the political implications of Kant's moral and political project, it is reasonable to expect a detailed engagement with Kant's theory of justice. Unfortunately, Saurette gives no consideration to Kant's 'Doctrine of Right' or Kant's political essays. Not only is this highly problematic in itself, but it also entails that Saurette never engages Kant's claim that it is both impossible and wrong to use coercion in an attempt to make others act morally (experience humiliation in Kant's sense). Because Saurette does not consider 'The Doctrine of Right,' he fails to notice Kant's distinction between enforceable and non-enforceable duties that yields the distinction between the theory of justice ('The Doctrine of Right') and the theory of morality ('The Doctrine of Virtue') as we find it in The Metaphysics of Morals. In short, Kant argues that all those virtues that require the moral motivation cannot be enforced. So any attempt to coerce persons to be moral (experience humiliation) will fail. Moreover, according to Kant's political theory, if a person uses physical coercion in an attempt to force others to be moral, she is depriving that person of her innate right to freedom, which is the cornerstone of Kant's conception of justice. Since Saurette ignores Kant's political writings, these central aspects of Kant's political theory are unfortunately not discussed.

Saurette's interpretation of humiliation is also problematic in that it fails to distinguish between Kant's conceptions of humiliation...